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ABSTRACT
This handbook chapter studies the theoretical micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies.
We distinguish three types of micro-foundations, based on sharing, matching, and learning
mechanisms. For each of these three categories, we develop one or more core models in detail and
discuss the literature in relation to those models. This allows us to give a precise characterisation
of some of the main theoretical underpinnings of urban agglomeration economies, to discuss
modelling issues that arise when working with these tools, and to compare different sources of
agglomeration economies in terms of the aggregate urban outcomes they produce as well as in terms
of their normative implications.
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Only 1.9% of the land area of the United States was built-up or paved by 1992. Yet,
despite the wide availability of open space, almost all recent development is less than
one kilometre away from earlier development. Not only does the proximity of earlier
development matter, but so does its density. Places where about one-half of the land in
the immediate vicinity is already built-up seem to be most attractive for new development
(Burchﬁeld, Overman, Puga, and Turner, 2003).
One cannot make sense of this sort of numbers, of the extent to which people cluster
together in cities and towns, without considering some form of agglomeration economies
or localised aggregate increasing returns. While space is not homogenous, it is futile to
try to justify the marked unevenness of development solely on the basis of space being
naturally heterogeneous: the land on which Chicago has been built, for instance, is not
all that different from other places on the shore of Lake Michigan that have been more
sparsely developed (see Cronon, 1991). And, once we abstract from the heterogeneity
of the underlying space, without indivisibilities or increasing returns, any competitive
equilibrium in the presence of transport costs will feature only fully autarchic locations
(this result, due to Starrett, 1978, is known as the spatial impossibility theorem).1 People
in each of these locations, like Robinson Crusoe, will produce all goods at a small scale for
self-consumption. Re-stated, without some form of increasing returns we cannot reconcile
cities with trade.
While increasing returns are essential to understand why there are cities, it is hard
to think of any single activity or facility subject to large-enough indivisibilities to justify
the existence of cities. Thus, one of the main challenges for urban economists is to
uncover mechanisms by which small-scale indivisibilities (or any other small-scale non-
convexities) aggregate up to localised aggregate increasing returns capable of sustaining
cities. We can then regard cities as the outcome of a trade-off between agglomeration
economies or localised aggregate increasing returns and the costs of urban congestion.
This is the object of this chapter: to study mechanisms that provide the microeconomic
foundations of urban agglomeration economies. We focus on the theoretical underpin-
nings of urban agglomeration economies, while the chapter by Rosenthal and Strange
(2004) in this volume discusses the corresponding empirical evidence.
By studying the micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies we are looking
inside the black box that justiﬁes the very existence of cities. We regard this as one of
the fundamental quests in urban economics for three main reasons. First, it is only by
studying what gives rise to urban agglomeration economies — rather than merely stating
that they exist — that we gain any real insight into why there are cities. Second, alternative
1See Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) in this volume for a detailed discussion of Starrett’s (1978) theorem.
1micro-foundations cannot be regarded as interchangeable contents for the black box. The
micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies interact with other building blocks
of urban models in ways that we cannot recognise unless they are explicitly stated. For
instance, the composition of cities typically emerges as a consequence of the scope of
different sources of agglomeration economies and their interaction with other aspects of
individual behaviour. Third, different micro-foundations have very different welfare and
policy implications. If we begin building an urban model by postulating an aggregate
production function with increasing returns, we can only take this function as given. If
insteadwederivethisaggregateproductionfunctionfromﬁrstprinciples, wemayseethat
its efﬁciency can be improved upon. The means for achieving such an improvement will
depend on the speciﬁcs of individual behaviour and technology. Thus, while different
assumptions regarding individual behaviour and technology may support similar ag-
gregate outcomes, the normative implications of alternative micro-foundations can differ
substantially.
Urban agglomeration economies are commonly classiﬁed into those arising from la-
bour market interactions, from linkages between intermediate- and ﬁnal-goods suppliers,
and from knowledge spill-overs, loosely following the three main examples provided by
Marshall (1890) in his discussion of the sources of agglomeration economies.2 While this
may be a sensible starting point for an empirical appraisal, we do not regard this as a
particularly useful basis for a taxonomy of theoretical mechanisms. Consider, for instance,
a model in which agglomeration facilitates the matching between ﬁrms and inputs. These
inputs may be labelled workers, intermediates, or ideas. Depending on the label chosen, a
matching model of urban agglomeration economies could be presented as a formalisation
of either one of Marshall’s three basic sources of agglomeration economies even though
it captures a single mechanism. Since the focus of this chapter is on theory, we want to
distinguish theories by the mechanism driving them rather than by the labels tagged to
model components in particular papers. With this objective in mind, we distinguish three
types of micro-foundations, based on sharing, matching, and learning mechanisms.3
Our discussion of micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies based on
sharing mechanisms deals with sharing indivisible facilities, sharing the gains from the
2Marshall is arguably the best known and most inﬂuent of the early analysts of agglomeration. However
Smith (1776) can be credited with the ﬁrst analysis of the beneﬁts from agglomeration, albeit with a more
narrow argument relying on the division of labour. Thünen (1826) pursued and extended his work. He
also proposed original arguments building on the interaction between ﬁxed costs and transport costs not far
from some of those developed below as highlighted by Fujita (2000).
3Marshall (1890, iv.x.3) successively discusses knowledge spill-overs, linkages between input suppliers
and ﬁnal producers, and labour market interactions. However, his discussion of each of these sources of
agglomeration economies highlights a different mechanism. Spill-overs are discussed in relation to the
acquisition of skills by workers and their learning about new technologies. The discussion of linkages
explicitly mentions the beneﬁts of sharing intermediate suppliers producing under increasing returns.
Finally, the ﬁst part of his labour market argument points at a matching mechanism.
2wider variety of input suppliers that can be sustained by a larger ﬁnal-goods industry,
sharing the gains from the narrower specialisation that can be sustained with larger pro-
duction, and sharing risks. In discussing micro-foundations based on matching, we study
mechanisms by which agglomeration improves either the expected quality of matches or
the probability of matching, and alleviates hold-up problems. Finally, when we look at
micro-foundations based on learning we discuss mechanisms based on the generation,
the diffusion, and the accumulation of knowledge.4
For each of the three main categories of this taxonomy, sharing, matching, and learning,
we develop one or more core models in detail and discuss the literature in relation to those
models. That allows us to give a precise characterisation of some of the main theoretical
underpinningsofurbanagglomerationeconomies, toillustratesomeimportantmodelling
issues that arise when working with these tools, and to compare different sources of
agglomeration economies in terms of the aggregate urban outcomes they produce as well
as in terms of their normative implications.
2. Sharing
2.1 Sharing indivisible goods and facilities
Tojustifytheexistenceofcities, perhapsthesimplestargumentistoinvoketheexistenceof
indivisibilities in the provision of certain goods or facilities. Consider a simple example:
an ice hockey rink. This is an expensive facility with substantial ﬁxed costs: it needs
to be of regulated dimensions, have a sophisticated refrigeration system to produce and
maintain the ice, a Zamboni to resurface it, etc. Few individuals, if any, would hold a rink
for themselves. And while having a community of 1,000 people share a rink is feasible,
building a rink for each of those people at 1/1,000th of the usual scale is not. An ice
hockey rink is therefore an indivisible facility that can be shared by many users. It is also
an excludable good, in the sense that use of the rink can be limited to members of a club
or a community. At the same time, as the size of the community using the rink grows, the
facility will be subject to increasing crowding. Crowding will take two forms. First, there
will be capacity constraints when too many people simultaneously try to use the facility.
Second, and more interesting in an urban context, crowding will also occur because the
facility needs to be located somewhere and, as the size of the community of users grows,
4In this chapter, we discuss only models in which both the demand and supply of factors (mainly labour)
are endogenous. In particular, we do not discuss the strategic location literature which takes the location of
consumers as given. This literature is discussed in depth by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992).
3some of those users will be located too far away from the facility.5
The problems associated with the provision of this type of facilities were ﬁrst high-
lighted by Buchanan (1965). They are the subject of a voluminous literature referred to
as club theory (or theory of local public goods when the spatial dimension is explicitly
taken into account). The main focus of this very large literature is on equilibrium concepts
(competitive, free mobility, Nash, core) and policy instruments. These issues are well
beyond the scope of this chapter and are thoroughly reviewed in Scotchmer (2002). Here
we just describe brieﬂy how one large indivisibility could provide a very simple formal
motive for the existence of cities.
Consider then a shared indivisible facility. Once the large ﬁxed cost associated with
this facility has been incurred, it provides an essential good to consumers at a constant
marginal cost. However, to enjoy this good consumers must commute between their
residence and the facility. We can immediately see that there is a trade-off between the
gains from sharing the ﬁxed cost of the facility among a larger number of consumers
and the costs of increasingly crowding the land around the facility (e.g., because of road
congestion, small lot sizes, etc.). We may think of a city as the equilibrium outcome of
such trade-off. In this context, cities would be no more than spatial clubs organised to
share a common local public good or facility.6
This ‘large indivisibility’ argument motivates urban increasing returns by directly as-
suming increasing returns at the aggregate level. Large indivisibilities in the provision of
some public good are just one possible motivation for this. A common alternative is to
assume large indivisibilities in some production activity. This corresponds to the idea of
a factory-town, where large ﬁxed costs create internal increasing returns in a production
activity that employs the workforce of an entire city whose size is bounded by crowding.
There is in fact a long tradition of modelling cities as the outcome of large indivisibilities
in production (Koopmans, 1957, Mills, 1967, Mirrlees, 1972). And since they constitute
such a simple modelling device, factory-towns are still used as the simplest possible
prototype cities to study a variety of issues, including ﬁscal decentralisation (Henderson
and Abdel-Rahman, 1991), urban production patterns (Abdel-Rahman and Fujita, 1993),
and economic growth in a system of cities (Duranton, 2000). However, it is fair to say that
factory-towns are empirically the exception rather than the rule in most countries.
5Notethatthisexampleisrepresentativeofawideclassofsharedfacilitiesthatareexcludableandsubject
to indivisibilities and crowding. These range from parks, museums, opera houses, and schools, to airports,
train stations, and even power plants.
6We do not worry here about the ﬁnancing of the shared facility. Let us simply note that under compet-
itive facility provision ﬁnanced by local capitalisation in the land market, the equilibrium is efﬁcient. This
result is known as the Henry George Theorem (Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski, 1974, Stiglitz, 1977,
Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979) and is discussed at length in Fujita (1989) and in Fujita and Thisse (2002). An
equivalent result applies to the case of a factory-town discussed below (Serck-Hanssen, 1969, Starrett, 1974,
Vickrey, 1977).
4Finally, it has been suggested that this type of large indivisibilities could apply to the
existence of market places (Wang, 1990, Berliant and Wang, 1993, Wang, 1993, Berliant and
Konishi, 2000, Konishi, 2000).7 Indeed, economic historians (e.g., Bairoch, 1988) have long
recognised the crucial role played by cities in market exchange. However, the hypothesis
of large indivisibilities in marketplaces is once again at best a small part of the puzzle of
why cities exist.
To summarise, given Starrett’s (1978) result that without some form of increasing
returns we cannot explain agglomeration within a homogenous area, the easiest route
to take in justifying the existence of cities is to assume increasing returns at the city
level by means of a large indivisibility. While large indivisibilities are useful modelling
devices when the main object of interest is not the foundations of urban agglomeration
economies, they side-step the issue of what gives rise to increasing returns at the level of
cities. Cities facilitate sharing many indivisible public goods, production facilities, and
marketplaces. However, it would be unrealistic to justify cities on the basis of a single
activity subject to extremely large indivisibilities. The challenge in urban modelling is to
propose mechanisms whereby different activities subject to small non-convexities gather
in the same location to form a city. Stated differently, micro-founded models of cities need to
reconcile plausible city-level increasing returns with non-degenerate market structures.
2.2 Sharing the gains from variety
In this section we ﬁrst derive an aggregate production function that exhibits aggregate
increasing returns due to input sharing despite constant returns to scale in perfectly-
competitive ﬁnal production. This is based on Ethier’s (1982) production-side version
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Aggregate increasing returns arise here from the productive
advantages of sharing a wider variety of differentiated intermediate inputs produced by a
monopolistically-competitive industry à la Chamberlin (1933). We then embed this model
in an urban framework following Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990). This allows us to de-
7These papers typically consider a small ﬁnite number of connected regions with differing endowments.
Because of Ricardian comparative advantage, some marketplaces emerge and they are labelled cities. Wang
(1990) establishes the existence and optimality of a competitive equilibrium with one endogenous market-
place in a pure exchange economy with exogenous consumer location. Berliant and Wang (1993) allow for
endogenous location of consumers in a three region economy. Wang (1993) also allows for endogenous
location in a two region economy with immobile goods. Berliant and Konishi (2000) revisit this problem
in a production economy. Allowing for multiple marketplaces and differences in transport costs and
marketplace set-up costs, they establish some existence and efﬁciency results. Finally, Konishi (2000) shows
how asymmetries in transport costs can lead to the formation of hub-cities where workers employed in
the transport sector agglomerate. The large indivisibilities assumed in these papers presumably reﬂect not
so much ﬁxed costs of market infrastructure but other considerations, such as the advantages of central-
ised quality assurance (see Cronon, 1991, and the chapter by Kim and Margo, 2004, in this volume for a
discussion of how this sort of consideration helped Chicago become the main metropolis of the American
Midwest).
5rive equilibrium city sizes resulting from a trade-off between aggregate increasing returns
and congestion costs as well as a basic result on urban specialisation due to Henderson
(1974).
2.2.1 From ﬁrm-level to aggregate increasing returns
There are m sectors, super-indexed by j = 1,...,m. In each sector, perfectly competitive
ﬁrms produce goods for ﬁnal consumption under constant returns to scale. Final pro-
ducers use intermediate inputs, which are speciﬁc to each sector and enter into plants’
technology with a constant elasticity of substitution (1 + ej)/ej, where ej > 0. Thus,










where xj(h) denotes the aggregate amount of intermediate h used and nj is the ‘number’
(mass) of intermediate inputs produced in equilibrium, to be endogenously determined.
As in Ethier (1982), intermediate inputs are produced by monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each intermediate producer’s technology is described
by the production function
xj(h) = βjlj(h) − αj , (2)
where lj(h) denotes the ﬁrm’s labour input, βj is the marginal productivity of labour, and
αj is a ﬁxed cost in sector j. Thus, there are increasing returns to scale in the production
of each variety of intermediates.8 This and the fact that there is an unlimited range of
intermediate varieties that could be produced and no economies of scope imply that each
intermediate ﬁrm produces just one variety and that no variety is produced by more than
one ﬁrm.
Let us denote by qj(h) the price of sector j intermediate variety h. The minimisation of
ﬁnal production costs
R nj
0 qj(h)xj(h)dh subject to the technological constraint of equation













It is immediate from (3) that each intermediate ﬁrm faces an elasticity of demand with
respect to its own price of −(1 + ej)/ej. Hence, the proﬁt-maximising price for each
8Obviously, technology could also be described in terms of the labour required to produce any level of
output, lj(h) = (xj(h) − αj)/βj, as it is often done following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
6intermediate is a ﬁxed relative markup over marginal cost:
qj =
1+ ej
βj wj , (4)
where wj denotes the wage in sector j. Note that we have dropped index h since all
variables take identical values for all intermediate suppliers in the same sector.
There is free entry and exit of intermediate suppliers. This drives their maximised
proﬁts to zero: qjxj − wjlj = 0. Using equations (2) and (4) to expand this expression and
solving for xj shows that the only level of output by an intermediate producer consistent




This, together with (2), implies that each intermediate producer hires lj = αj(1 +








where Lj denotes total labour supply in intermediate sector j.
By choice of units of intermediate output, we can set βj = (1 + ej)(αj/ej)ej/(1+ej).














This obviously exhibits aggregate increasing returns to scale at the sector level. The reason
isthatanincreaseinthelabourinputofsector j mustbeassociatedwithmoreintermediate
producers, as can be seen from (6); and, by (1), ﬁnal producers become more productive
whentheyhaveaccesstoawiderrangeofvarieties. Re-stated, anincreaseinﬁnalproduction
by virtue of sharing a wider variety of intermediate suppliers requires a less-than-proportional
increase in primary factors.9
9Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985) propose an alternative approach in which agglomeration also relies on
sharing the gains from variety. Their approach, which builds on a shopping framework, highlights well the
importance of interactions between ﬁrms and households. While the shopping behaviour of individuals is
exogenously imposed rather than derived from a well-speciﬁed preference structure, it has later been shown
to be consistent with random utility maximisation (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992).
72.2.2 Urban structure
Next, following Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), let us place in an urban context the
production structure we have just described. Consider an economy with a continuum of
potential locations for cities, sub-indexed by i.10
Let us model the internal spatial structure of each city in a very simple fashion. Pro-
duction in each city takes place at a single point, deﬁned as the Central Business District
(cbd).11 Surrounding each city’s cbd, there is a line with residences of unit length. Resid-
ents commute from their residence to the cbd and back at a cost. In practice, commuting
costs include both the direct monetary cost of travelling and the opportunity cost of the
time spent on the journey (Small, 1992). However, let us simplify by assuming that the
only cost of commuting is the opportunity cost of time.12 Speciﬁcally, each worker loses in
commuting a fraction of her unit of working time equal to 2τ times the distance travelled
in going to the cbd and back home (τ > 0).
Each worker chooses her place of residence so as to maximise utility given her income
and the land rent function in the city. Because of ﬁxed lot size, this is equivalent to
choosing residence so as to maximise net income. Thus, a worker in sector j in city i
maximises w
j
i(1 − 4τs) − Ri(s) with respect to s, where s is the distance to the cbd and
Ri(s) is the differential land rent in city i for a residence located at distance s from the cbd.
The possibility of arbitrage across residential locations both within and across sectors
ensures that at the residential equilibrium the sum of commuting cost and land rent ex-
penditures is the same for all residents with the same wage; that workers sort themselves
according to their wage, with higher-paid workers (who have a higher opportunity cost of
commuting time) living closer to the cbd; that the city is symmetric and the city edges are
at a distance Ni/2 of the cbd (where Ni is total population in city i); and that the land rent
10Here we follow Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) in embedding the production structure described
above in a system of cities. In earlier papers, Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita (1988), and Rivera-Batiz (1988)
embed similar production structures in an urban framework with a single city. The details of these pi-
oneering papers differ slightly from those of our presentation. Instead of having the monopolistically
competitive sector supplying differentiated intermediates, Abdel-Rahman (1988) has this sector producing
differentiated ﬁnal goods. They are aggregated with a constant elasticity of substitution into a sub-utility
function, which enters as an argument into a Cobb-Douglas utility function together with land and a traded
good produced under constant return. Also, our speciﬁcation of the urban structure is a bit simpler than
his, as we impose a ﬁxed size for residences. Rivera-Batiz (1988) considers two sources of agglomeration
economies, by assuming gains from variety both at the level of intermediates (like here) and of ﬁnal goods.
Finally, Fujita (1988) uses a different speciﬁcation for the gains from variety, which bears resemblance with
the entropy functions used in information theory. Another difference is that in his model both ﬁrms and
households compete for urban land, whereas we only consider a residential land market. Also, he assumes
that goods are imperfectly mobile within the city, which allows for non-monocentric urban structures.
11We take the existence of a cbd as given. For contributions that derive this endogenously, see Borukhov
and Hochman (1977), Fujita and Ogawa (1982), and the additional references provided in subsection 4.2.2.
12This allows us to solve for equilibrium city sizes without having to track output prices in a multiple-
sector setting. In section 3.1 we explore the opposite simpliﬁcation of having only a monetary cost of
commuting.
8function (i.e., the upper envelope of all bid-rent functions, Alonso, 1964) is continuous,
convex, and piece-wise linear.13 Without loss of generality, the rent at the city edges is





The net amount of labour available to sector j at the cbd of city i, L
j
i, is equal to the number
of workers employed in that sector minus their commuting time. Summing across sectors











i = Ni(1− τNi) . (9)
Finally, workers can move at no cost across sectors as well as across cities. Income from
land rents is equally distributed across all local residents.
2.2.3 Urban specialisation
One important difference between our presentation of this framework and the original
contribution of Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) is that we consider more than one sector.
This allows us to derive Henderson’s (1974) result on urban specialisation, which can
be seen as a statement on the scope of urban agglomeration economies. This type of
agglomeration economies based on the proximity to ﬁrms in the same sector is often
labelled ‘localisation economies’. For simplicity, assume that ﬁnal goods can be freely
traded across cities.14 Intermediate goods, on the other hand, can only be used by local
ﬁrms.15
We now prove that in this simple set-up each city must be specialised in a single sector in
equilibrium. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is more than one active sector in some
13Models with a richer internal urban structure often consider endogenous differences across residences
in terms of their size and land intensity (see Brueckner, 1987, for a review). Then, residences closer to the cbd
arenotonlymoreexpensivebutalsosmallerandmorelandintensive. Mattersarefurthercomplicatedwhen
one considers durable housing and the possibility of redevelopment (see Brueckner, 2000, for a review).
There is also a large literature analysing the sorting of residents across neighbourhoods. It considers how
income affects the valuation of land, that of leisure foregone in commuting, and that of access to amenities,
all of which contribute to determining residential location (see Beckmann, 1969; Brueckner, 1987; and
Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou, 1999).
14We discuss below the consequences of relaxing this assumption. Basically, introducing trade costs in
ﬁnal goods provides a static motivation for urban diversiﬁcation.
15If intermediates are tradeable across cities ﬁnal producers in each sector still beneﬁt from having greater
local employment and more local ﬁrms engaged in intermediate production, as long as the intermediates
produced locally are available at a lower transport cost than those purchased from remote locations and
represent a non-negligible share of the total set of intermediates.






i, where Pj is the price of the
ﬁnal good in sector j. Substituting into this equation our expression for aggregate output










The possibility of arbitrage by workers across sectors and residences ensures the equal-
isation of this wage across all active sectors in all cities. Starting from a conﬁguration
where this equality holds, consider a small perturbation in the distribution of workers
across sectors in some city. It follows immediately from (10) that sectors that have gained
employment will now pay higher wages as a result of having more intermediate suppliers
and thus a higher level of output per worker. Net income will be further enhanced by
the advantage this higher wage provides in the residential housing market. That will
allow ﬁrms in this enlarged sector to attract even more workers. Sectors that have lost
employment will instead provide lower wages and income and, as a result, lose even more
workers. Thus, in order to be stable with respect to small perturbations in the distribution
of workers, any equilibrium must be characterised by full specialisation of each and every
city in a single sector.
2.2.4 Equilibrium city sizes
We now turn to calculating equilibrium city sizes. Consider how the utility of individual
workers in a city varies with the city’s population. With free trade in ﬁnal goods and
homothetic preferences, utility is an increasing function of consumption expenditure. In
equilibrium, all workers receive the same consumption expenditure because the lengthier
commuting for those living further away from the cbd is exactly offset by lower land rents.
Substituting the expression for net labour of equation (9) into the aggregate production
function of equation (7), dividing by Ni, and using the urban specialisation result yields














Note that land rents do not appear in this expression because each worker receives an
income from her share of local land rents equal to the rent of the average local worker.
While individual land rents differ from the average, lower rents for those living further
away from the cbd are exactly offset by lengthier commuting.



















Figure 1. Utility as a function of city size
The efﬁcient size of a city is the result of a trade-off between urban agglomeration economies and
urban crowding. Efﬁcient city size Nj∗
decreases with commuting costs as measured by
τ and increases with the extent of aggregate increasing returns as measured by ej.16 An
immediate corollary of this is that the efﬁcient size is larger for cities specialised in sectors
that exhibit greater aggregate increasing returns (as argued by Henderson, 1974).
In equilibrium, all cities of the same specialisation are of equal size and this size is not smaller
than the efﬁcient size. To see this, notice ﬁrst that cities of a given specialisation are of at
most two different sizes in equilibrium (one above and one below the efﬁcient size). This
follows from (11) and utility equalisation across cities. However, cities below the efﬁcient
size will not survive small perturbations in the distribution of workers — as illustrated by
the arrows in ﬁgure 1, those that gain population will get closer to the efﬁcient size and
attract even more workers while those that lose population will get further away from
the efﬁcient size and lose even more workers. The same does not apply to cities above
the efﬁcient size — in this case, those that gain population will get further away from
the efﬁcient size while those that lose population will get closer. The combination of free
mobility with a stability requirement therefore implies the result that cities of the same
specialisation are of equal size and too large.
The result that cities are too large is the consequence of a coordination failure with respect to
16As ej increases, the elasticity of substitution across the varieties of intermediate inputs ((1+ej)/ej) falls,
so that there is a greater beneﬁt from having access to a wider range of varieties.
11city creation. Everyone would prefer, say, three cities of the efﬁcient size to two cities 50%
above the efﬁcient size. But an individual worker is too small to create a city on her
own and so far there is no mechanism for her to coordinate with other workers. Various
mechanisms for city creation would achieve efﬁcient city sizes. Two such mechanisms are
competitive proﬁt-maximising developers and active local governments (see Henderson,
1985; and Becker and Henderson, 2000). Once this coordination failure is resolved, the
equilibrium is fully efﬁcient.
Efﬁciency in this type of models depends on three sorts of assumptions: those about
city formation, those about urban structure, and those about the micro-foundations of
urban agglomeration economies. As just mentioned, the main issue with city formation is
the ability to resolve a coordination failure. Regarding internal urban structure, the main
issue in the literature is who collects land rents. If landlords are non-resident (‘absentee’)
part of the beneﬁts of local agglomeration are captured by agents who are unaffected
by the costs of local crowding. The assumption of common land ownership used in this
sectionresolvesthissourceofinefﬁciency(PinesandSadka,1986).17 Anadditionalissueis
whether congestion distorts individual choices (Oron, Pines, and Sheshinski, 1973, Solow,
1973). Finally, what has received almost no attention in the literature is the fact that the
source of urban agglomeration economies also matters for the efﬁciency of equilibrium
(a notable exception is the introduction to chapter 8 of Fujita, 1989). We have chosen to
start with a model in which the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies create
no inefﬁciencies — more accurately, the inefﬁciencies present exactly cancel out.18 In
section 3.1 we will show that different micro-foundations have very different welfare
implications.
2.2.5 Cross-sector interactions and trade costs
The urban specialisation result derived above relies crucially on two assumptions: that
inputs are only shared within and not across sectors and that trade in ﬁnal goods is
costless while trade in intermediate inputs is inﬁnitely costly. In order to make this type of
model consistent with the empirical coexistence of diversiﬁed and specialised cities and
to incorporate space in a more meaningful way, several contributions have extended it to
17Under common land ownership the share of land rents received by each household is equal to the
marginal externality arising from urban agglomeration economies. Thus, the redistributed land rents act as
a Pigouvian subsidy.
18As shown by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in their now standard model of monopolistic
competition with a constant elasticity of substitution across varieties, the private beneﬁt to ﬁrms from
entering and stealing some customers from incumbents exactly equals the social beneﬁt from increased
variety. Hence, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is efﬁcient. While intermediate ﬁrms price above marginal
cost, relative input prices within each sector are unaffected by the common mark-up so that input choices
are undistorted.
12allow for cross-sector interactions and for trade costs. Here we just mention some of these
extensions. For a more detailed discussion, see Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004) in this
volume as well as Duranton and Puga (2000).
A ﬁrst set of extensions to the basic input sharing framework allows for cross-sector
interactions, either by incorporating non-tradeable goods produced in all cities (Abdel-
Rahman, 1990), or by assuming economies of scope that result in cost savings when
several sectors operate in the same city (Abdel-Rahman, 1994). Both extensions provide
a static motive for urban diversity. Another static motive for urban diversity arises in
the presence of transport costs. These are incorporated in a version of the input-sharing
framework with discrete space by Abdel-Rahman (1996). This extension highlights the
trade-off between the gains from urban specialisation due to localisation economies and
thetransportcostsincurredwhenothergoodshavetobeshippedtoaspecialisedcity. This
trade-off creates a tendency for cities to become more specialised by sector as transport
costs decline.19
The next steps towards a better modelling of physical distance in urban systems have
been taken in a series of papers that extend the approach developed by Krugman (1991a)
for regional systems to continuous space (Krugman, 1993a,b, Fujita and Krugman, 1995,
Fujita and Mori, 1996, 1997, Fujita, Krugman, and Mori, 1999, Fujita and Krugman, 2000,
Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2001).20 These papers introduce continuous physical space and an
agricultural sector that uses land and labour to supply food to cities whose number, popu-
lation, composition, and location are endogenous. Two additional differences with respect
tothestandardinput-sharingframeworkpresentedabovearethelackofurbancongestion
costs and the different mechanism driving city formation (here cities are the aggregate
outcome of uncoordinated decisions by ﬁrms and workers whereas in the framework
above competitive proﬁt-maximising land developers act as a coordinating device). When
there is a single manufacturing sector, this framework quite naturally generates a system
19The comparative statics of Abdel-Rahman (1996) provide a nice justiﬁcation for the increasing sectoral
specialisation of cities during the nineteenth century. However, despite a sustained decline in shipping
costs over the last 50 years, cities have become less rather than more specialised by sector. Duranton and
Puga (2001a) give evidence of a strong transformation of the urban structure of the United States from a
mainly sectoral to a mainly functional specialisation. They provide an explanation for this transformation
by extending the canonical input sharing model to incorporate a spatial friction motivated by the costs
of remote management together with some cross-sector interactions arising from the sharing of business
service suppliers by headquarters.
20Fujita and Krugman (2000) explore analytically a number of equilibrium conﬁgurations in this type of
framework, while Fujita et al. (1999) deal with equilibrium selection issues. Krugman (1993a) proposes a
much simpler framework where the number and location of cities is set exogenously. Krugman (1993b)
analyses the location problem for a unique city in a bounded agricultural interval. Fujita and Krugman
(1995) is a simpler version of Fujita and Krugman (2000) where only one equilibrium conﬁguration is
explored. Fujita and Mori (1996) extend this type of framework to a more complex geography with land
and sea to show why large cities are often port cities. Fujita and Mori (1997) is a ﬁrst dynamic treatment
of equilibrium selection issues, which is then reﬁned in Fujita et al. (1999). Finally, Fujita and Hamaguchi
(2001) is an extension of Fujita and Krugman (2000) that explicitly considers intermediate goods.
13of cities, where cities may have different sizes and smaller cities are miniature replicas of
the larger cities. When there are multiple manufacturing sectors and goods have different
shipping costs, this type of framework can generate hierarchical systems of cities as in
traditional central-place theory. Starting from an economy with a unique city, population
growth expands the agricultural hinterland and leads sectors with higher shipping costs
to spread out. The main city keeps all sectors, but new peripheral cities form, initially
producing goods with high shipping costs and importing the remaining goods from the
main city.
Toconcludeonthissection, notethatChamberlinianinputsharingoccupiesadominant
position in the literature on urban agglomeration economies. This is partly because of the
simplicity and intuitive appeal of this framework, but cumulative causation has probably
played a role as well — this framework is well known by most authors in the ﬁeld and
using it facilitates comparisons with previous results. However, urban agglomeration
economies cannot be reduced to this simple input sharing framework.
2.3 Sharing the gains from individual specialisation
The micro-economic foundations for urban agglomeration economies presented in the
previous section capture a plausible motive for agglomeration. However, they have been
subject to two main criticisms. First, they seem somewhat mechanical: a larger workforce
leads to the production of more varieties of intermediates, and this increases ﬁnal output
more than proportionately because of the constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregation
by ﬁnal producers. Second, any expansion in intermediate production takes the form of
an increase in the number of intermediate suppliers and not in the scale of operation of
each supplier.21 That is, an increase in the workforce only shifts the extensive margin of
production.
Adam Smith’s (1776) original pin factory example points at another direction: the
intensive margin instead of the extensive margin of production. In the pin factory example,
having more workers increases output more than proportionately not because extra workers can
carry new tasks but because it allows existing workers to specialise on a narrower set of tasks. In
other words, the Smithian hypothesis is that there are productivity gains from an increase
in specialisation when workers spend more time on each task.
To justify this hypothesis, Smith gives three main reasons. First, by performing the
same task more often workers improve their dexterity at this particular task. Today we
would call this ‘learning by doing’. Second, not having workers switch tasks saves some
ﬁxed costs, such as those associated with changing tools, changing location within the
factory, etc. Third, a greater division of labour fosters labour-saving innovations because
21See Holmes (1999) for a version of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that considers both.
14simpler tasks can be mechanised more easily. Rosen (1983) also highlights that when
acquiring skills entails ﬁxed costs it is advantageous for each individual to specialise
her investment in skills to a narrow band of skills and employ them as intensively as
possible.22
In an urban context these ideas have been taken up by a small number of authors
(Baumgardner, 1988, Becker and Murphy, 1992, Duranton, 1998, Becker and Henderson,
2000, Henderson and Becker, 2000).23 The exposition below follows Duranton (1998). The
rest of the literature is discussed further below.
2.3.1 From individual gains from specialisation to aggregate increasing returns
Consider a perfectly competitive industry in which ﬁrms produce a ﬁnal good by com-
bining a variety of tasks that enter into their technology with a constant elasticity of
substitution (e + 1)/e, just as intermediates entered into equation (1) of section 2.2.24
The main difference with the previous framework is that only a given set of tasks may be
produced. Speciﬁcally, with tasks indexed by h, we assume that h ∈ [0,¯ n], where ¯ n is ﬁxed.
This assumption plays two roles. It formalises the idea that ﬁnal goods are produced by
performing a ﬁxed collection of tasks. It also leaves aside the gains from variety explored










Each atomistic worker is endowed with one unit of labour. Any worker allocating an
amount of time l(h) to perform task h produces
x(h) = β[l(h)]
1+θ , (14)
units of this task, where β is a productivity parameter and θ measures the intensity of the
individual gains from specialisation. Note that l(h) can be interpreted as a measure of
specialisation, since the more time that is allocated to task h the less time that is left for
other tasks. This equation corresponds to (2) in the previous framework. As in equation
(2), there are increasing returns to scale in the production of each task. However, the
22Stigler (1951) argues that the Smithian argument also applies to the division of labour between ﬁrms.
However, to-date there is no complete formalisation of his argument.
23We deal here only with the papers that explicitly model the gains from an increase in specialisation
following the intuitions given by Smith (1776). Some papers, despite heavy references to Smith (1776),
model increasing returns in a different fashion. For instance, Kim (1989) actually develops a matching
argument. It is thus discussed in Section 3.
24Note the change in terminology. To follow the literature, we now speak of tasks rather than intermediate
goods. But formally, these concepts are equivalent. Note also that we have dropped super-index j = 1,...,m
for sectors. Allthat would be achieved byconsidering morethan onesector wouldbe thechance tore-derive
the urban specialisation result of section 2.2.
15source of the gains is different. Here the gains are internal to an individual worker rather
than to an intermediate ﬁrm (to be consistent with the learning-by-doing justiﬁcation
given above) and they arise because a worker’s marginal productivity in a given task
increases with specialisation in that task.
Workers’ decisions are modelled as a two-stage game.25 In the ﬁrst stage, workers
choose which tasks to perform. In the second stage, workers set prices for the tasks
they have decided to perform. We consider only the unique symmetric sub-game perfect
equilibrium of this game. Whenever two or more workers choose to perform the same
task in the ﬁrst stage, they become Bertrand competitors in the second stage and receive
no revenue from this task. If instead only one workers chooses to perform some task in













This revenue is always positive. Thus, a sub-game perfect equilibrium must have the
property that no task is performed by more than one worker. Furthermore, if θ < e (which
we assume is the case), then marginal revenue is decreasing in l(h). Thus, a sub-game
perfect equilibrium must also have the property that every task is performed by some
worker. Combining these two properties implies that there is a unique symmetric sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which each and every task is performed by just one worker.
Given that there are L workers and ¯ n tasks, this implies that each worker devotes L/¯ n of
her unit labour endowment to each of the ¯ n/L tasks she performs. Substituting l(h) =
L/¯ n into equation (14), and this in turn into equation (13), yields aggregate production as
Y = β ¯ ne−θ(L)
1+θ . (16)
Like (7), this equation exhibits aggregate increasing returns to scale. However, note that
the extent of increasing returns is driven by the gains from labour specialisation as meas-
ured by θ and not by e, the elasticity of substitution across tasks as in equation (7) (since ¯ n
is ﬁxed).27 In this model, an increase in the size of the workforce leads to a deepening of
the division of labour between workers, which makes each worker more productive. Put
25This differs from Duranton (1998), who uses a solution concept based on a conjectural variation argu-
ment in a one stage game.
26To derive this expression, we ﬁrst derive the conditional demand for task h, which is completely
analogous to the conditional demand for intermediate input h of equation (3). We can then use this to
determine the unit cost of ﬁnal output:
R ¯ n





. This unit costs equals 1 since
the ﬁnal good is the numéraire. Using this result to simplify the expression for conditional demand, solving
this for q(h), and multiplying the result by x(h) yields the ﬁrst part of equation (15). The second part results
from replacing x(h) by its value in equation (13).
27Note that the only result in this section that relies on the constant elasticity of substitution aggregation
is that all tasks are produced in equilibrium.
16differently, there are gains from the division of labour that are limited by the extent of the (labour)
market.
This aggregate production function can be embedded in the same urban framework as
above. If we normalise ¯ n = 1, efﬁcient city size is now equal to N∗ = θ
(2θ+1)τ. Again, the
efﬁcient size of a city is the result of a trade-off between urban agglomeration economies
(this time driven by the specialisation of labour) and urban crowding.
2.3.2 Alternative speciﬁcations
Baumgardner (1988), Becker and Murphy (1992), and Becker and Henderson (2000) pro-
pose alternative speciﬁcations to model the effects of the division of labour. Baumgardner
(1988) uses a partial equilibrium framework with exogenous locations. In his model, tasks
are interpreted as differentiated ﬁnal goods for which demand may vary, like the different
specialities performed by medical doctors. Interestingly he considers three different equi-
librium concepts: a monopoly worker, a co-operative coalition of workers, and Cournot
competition between workers (instead of price competition as assumed above). Results
are robust to these changes in the equilibrium concept, and very similar to those obtained
above: there are gains to the division of labour and these are limited by the extent of
the market. It is worth noting that with Cournot competition, workers may compete
directly and produce similar tasks whereas efﬁciency requires a complete segmentation
of workers.
Becker and Murphy (1992) consider a framework where tasks are produced according
to a speciﬁcation equivalent to (14). These tasks are then perfect complements to produce
the ﬁnal good. The aggregation of tasks in their model is not done through a market
mechanism but rather in a co-operative fashion within production teams. In this setting,
Becker and Murphy (1992) obtain a reduced form for the aggregate production function
similar to that of equation (16). Their main objective however is to argue against the
existence of increasing returns at the city level. To sustain this conclusion, they add some
un-speciﬁed co-ordination costs to the production for ﬁnal goods. These co-ordination
costs put an upper bound to the division of labour. When the market is sufﬁciently large,
the division of labour is then limited by co-ordination costs rather than by the extent of
the market.
Becker and Henderson (2000) build on Becker and Murphy (1992) in a full-ﬂedged
urban model. They consider the role of entrepreneurs whose monitoring increases the
marginal product of workers. Having entrepreneurs in charge of a smaller range of tasks
allows them to monitor their workers better. As in Becker and Murphy (1992), the details
of the market structure remain unspeciﬁed. In equilibrium, this alternative mechanism
again yields increasing returns at the city level.
172.4 Sharing risk
An alternative sharing mechanism that has long been recognised as a source of agglom-
eration economies is labour pooling. The basic idea, to use Alfred Marshall’s phrase, is
that ‘a localised industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant
market for skill’ (Marshall, 1890, p. 271). What follows is based on the formalisation of
this argument by Krugman (1991b).
Consider an industry composed of a discrete number of ﬁrms n producing under
decreasing returns to scale using workers drawn from a continuum a homogeneous good
used as the numéraire.28 Each ﬁrm’s technology is described by the production function




where γ measures the intensity of decreasing returns and ε(h) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productiv-
ity shock. Firm-speciﬁc shocks are identical and independently distributed over [−ε,ε]
with mean 0 and variance σ2.
Firms decide how many workers to hire after experiencing their ﬁrm-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity shock and taking market wages as given. Proﬁt maximising wage-taking ﬁrms
pay workers their marginal value product which, by (17), implies
w = β + ε(h) − γl(h) . (18)
Summing equation (18) over the n ﬁrms, dividing the result by n, and using the labour
market clearing condition ∑
n
h=1 l(h) = L, yields










Hence the expected wage is




This expected wage increases with the number of ﬁrms. This is because, with decreasing
returns, a reduction of employment in each ﬁrm implies a higher marginal product of
labour and thus higher wages. The expected wage also decreases with the size of the local
labour force (L) and with the intensity of decreasing returns (γ).
In equilibrium, employment in all ﬁrms must be non-negative. This non-negativity
constraint will not be binding for any realisation of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks
if equation (18) implies a positive employment for a ﬁrm whose idiosyncratic productivity
shock is −ε when all other ﬁrms experience a positive productivity shock equal to ε. In
28The argument generalises readily to differentiated ﬁrms. The assumption of a homogeneous good
ensures that, unlike previously, product variety plays no role here.
18this case, using (18), l(h) > 0 requires w < β − ε. Substituting into this expression the







We assume that this parameter restriction, which requires the support of the distribution
of productivity shocks not to be too large relative to the intensity of decreasing returns, is
satisﬁed (otherwise the computations that follow become intractable).
The proﬁt of ﬁnal producer h is given by π(h) = y(h) − wl(h). Using equations (17)
and (18), this simpliﬁes into:
π(h) =
[β + ε(h) − w]2
2γ
. (22)
Note that this proﬁt function is convex in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shock since the
ﬁrm responds to the shock by adjusting its level of production. Similarly the proﬁt
function is convex in the wage.
Taking expectations of (22) yields a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt. Since the expected value
of the square of a random variable is equal to the square of its mean plus its variance,
expected proﬁts in location i are equal to:
E(π) =
[β − E(w)]2 + var[ε(h) − w]
2γ
. (23)
Note that var[ε(h)−w] ≡ var[ε(h)]+var(w)−2cov[ε(h),w]. Thus, ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts
increase with the variance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks and with the variance of
wages, consistently with the convexity argument given above. However, they decrease
with the covariance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks and wages: if wages are higher
when the ﬁrm wants to expand production in response to a positive shock and lower when the ﬁrm
wantsto contractproduction inresponseto anegativeshock, proﬁtsbecome lessconvexin theshock
and fall in expectation. Using (19), it is easy to verify that var(w) = cov[ε(h),w] = σ2/n.
Substituting this and var[ε(h)] = σ2 into the previous expression yields var[ε(h) − w] =














This ﬁnal expression for the expected proﬁt of an individual ﬁrm contains the main
result of this section.29 The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (24) is the value that
29Equation (24) corrects a mistake in the corresponding equation (c 10) in Krugman (1991b). The mistake
is apparent by inspection: the expression for the expected proﬁt of an individual ﬁrm in Krugman (1991b)
implies that, in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks (σ2 = 0), each ﬁrm makes a larger proﬁt the smaller the


































Figure 2. Phase diagram for the labour market pooling equilibrium
individual ﬁrm proﬁts would take in the absence of shocks (i.e., with σ2 = 0). Because
of decreasing returns, there is a positive wedge between the marginal product of labour
paid to the workers and their average product received by the ﬁrm. Thus, this ﬁrst term in
(24) increases with the intensity of decreasing returns (γ) and with employment per ﬁrm
(L/n).
The second term on the right-hand side of (24) captures a positive labour pooling ef-
fect. Each ﬁrm beneﬁts from sharing its labour market with more ﬁrms in the face of
idiosyncratic shocks. In addition to increasing with the number of ﬁrms, the beneﬁts of
labour pooling increase with the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks.30 These beneﬁts
also decrease with the intensity of decreasing returns because labour demand by ﬁrms
becomes less elastic with respect to the idiosyncratic shocks.
Suppose now that we consider two local labour markets, sub-indexed 1 and 2, with
risk-neutral ﬁrms and workers choosing their location before the idiosyncratic productiv-
ity shocks are realised. Krugman (1991b) deﬁnes an interior equilibrium in this framework
as an allocation of ﬁrms and workers across locations such that expected proﬁts and ex-
30This is, of course, subject to equation (21) being satisﬁed. If (21) is not satisﬁed, ﬁrms expect to be
inactive when their idiosyncratic shock falls below a certain threshold. This will reduce the variance of
the shocks for active ﬁrms and thus decrease the second term in the proﬁt expression (24). Note that this
non-negativity constraint for employment is absent from Krugman (1991b).
20pected wages are equalised across locations: E(π1)−E(π2) = 0 and E(w1)−E(w2) = 0.31
The two indifference loci are represented in ﬁgure 2, and labelled WW for workers and FF
for ﬁrms. It is clear that the symmetric situation where n1 = n2 = n/2 and L1 = L2 = L/2
satisﬁesthesetwoconditions. Thissymmetricequilibriumisrepresentedbypoint A inﬁg-
ure 2. Using equation (20), the locus of worker indifferenceWW where E(w1)−E(w2) = 0
corresponds to the straight line n1 = nL1/L. Regarding the locus of ﬁrm indifference FF,
using (24) one can show that the symmetric equilibrium is its only interior intersection
with the WW locus. Furthermore, to the left of the symmetric equilibrium point A, FF
is convex and lies below WW. To the right of A, FF is concave and lies above WW. The
intuition can be seen graphically by considering point B on the WW locus. At this point,
the ratio of ﬁrms to workers is the same in both location but location 1 has more of both.
By equation (24), proﬁts are thus higher in location 1. As depicted by the arrows in the
phase diagram 2, the symmetric equilibrium is saddle-path unstable with respect to small
simultaneous perturbations in the number of ﬁrms and workers. Thus, ﬁrms and workers
necessarily agglomerate in a single local labour market.
Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) point out that the equilibrium concept in Krugman
(1991b) is not consistent with the assumption of a discrete number of ﬁrms needed to
create the labour pooling effect. With a discrete number of ﬁrms, the equilibrium condi-
tion ensuring that ﬁrms have no incentive to deviate is not the equalisation of expected
ﬁrm proﬁts across locations but the condition that a ﬁrm does not increase its expected
proﬁts by changing location. This condition is represented in ﬁgure 2 by the shaded area
around the FF loci. Note that a ﬁrm deviating from the symmetric equilibrium raises the
expected wage that all ﬁrms, including itself, have to pay so it cannot achieve higher
expected proﬁts by deviating. This means that the symmetric equilibrium is always
a strict equilibrium. Furthermore, Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) show that the model
in Krugman (1991b) is an example of a class of models characterised by a plateau of












is an equilibrium.32 This plateau is represented
in ﬁgure 2 by the thick diagonal segment centred on the symmetric equilibrium. The size
of this plateau is greater the greater the extent of ﬁrm-level decreasing returns (γ), the
smaller the variance of productivity shocks (σ2), and the larger the worker-to-ﬁrm ratio
in the economy (L/n). This is because all of these make the beneﬁt of the larger market
31Note that this is equivalent to assuming that individual ﬁrms and workers have zero mass, so that indi-
vidual deviations do not affect expected proﬁts nor expected wages. This is consistent with the assumption
of a continuum of workers but inconsistent with the (necessary) assumption of a discrete number of ﬁrms.
We return to this issue below.
32This result is a direct application of theorem 1 in Ellison and Fudenberg (2003). See that paper for a
statement and proof of the theorem as well as a discussion of its application to the labour pooling model of
Krugman (1991b).
21due to labour pooling less important relative to the bidding-up of wages that the ﬁrm
generates by moving to that larger market. At the same time, agglomeration of all ﬁrms
and workers in one location is also an equilibrium.33
This model calls for a few additional comments. First, risk-aversion plays no role in the
agglomeration process. Agglomeration only stems from there being efﬁciency gains from
sharing resources among ﬁrms that do not know ex-ante how much of these resources
they will need. Because the variance of the wage decreases with the number of ﬁrms,
introducing risk-aversion would only reinforce the beneﬁts from labour pooling on the
workers’ side.34 Second, having sticky wages and allowing for unemployment instead
of the current competitive wage-setting would also reinforce the tendency for ﬁrms and
workers to agglomerate. In this case, workers have a greater incentive to agglomerate to
minimise the risk of being unemployed and thus receiving zero income, whereas ﬁrms
have a greater incentive to agglomerate to avoid being constrained by a small workforce
when they face a positive shock. Third, strategic (rather than competitive) behaviour by
ﬁrms in the labour market would slightly complicate the results. In particular, allowing
for some monopsony power would weaken the tendency of ﬁrms to agglomerate. This is
because agglomeration would increase competition in the labour market and thus reduce
monopsony rents. At the same time, strategic interactions in the labour market would
reinforce the beneﬁts of agglomeration for workers.35 Finally, note that the result crucially
relies on some small indivisibilities (ﬁrms are in ﬁnite number and cannot be active in
more than one location). Without such indivisibilities, all ﬁrms could locate in all labour
markets independently of their size and the location of labour would no longer matter.
This type of model has been recently extended by Stahl and Walz (2001) and Gerlach,
Rønde, and Stahl (2001). Stahl and Walz (2001) introduce sector-speciﬁc shocks together
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. They also assume that workers can move across sectors at a
cost. The beneﬁts of pooling are larger between sectors than within sectors because of
the weaker correlation between shocks across different sectors. At the same time, the
costs of pooling workers are also larger between sectors than within sectors because of
the switching costs. In equilibrium, there is thus a trade-off between the agglomeration
of ﬁrms in the same sector and the agglomeration of ﬁrms in different sectors. Gerlach
et al. (2001) relax the assumption of shocks being exogenous. Instead, they assume two
33Note that embedding this simple model in the same urban structure used in previous sections creates
the usual trade-off between urban agglomeration economies and urban congestion costs.
34In Economides and Siow (1988), consumers face uncertain endowments of different goods and need
to go to a market to trade. The variance of prices is lower in markets with more traders. When utility is
concave in all its arguments, consumers gain from market agglomeration. At the same time, operating in a
larger market is more expensive, so that there is a trade-off between liquidity and the costs of trade.
35In case the preferred location patterns for ﬁrms differ from those of workers, the exact timing of the
location decisions becomes decisive to determine the ﬁnal outcome.
22ﬁrms making risky investments to increase their productivity. In line with the results
above, the incentive for ﬁrms to agglomerate increases with the size of the expected
asymmetry in outcome between ﬁrms. The incentive to agglomerate is strongest when
the probability to have a successful investment is 50% (which maximises the probability of
the two ﬁrms being ex-post in different states) and when innovations are drastic. In their
framework, these beneﬁts of agglomeration for ﬁrms are limited by the costs of labour
market competition.
3. Matching
3.1 Improving the quality of matches
In this section we present a labour-market version of Salop’s (1979) matching model and
embed it in an urban framework. In this context there are two sources of agglomeration
economies. The ﬁrst is a matching externality ﬁrst highlighted by Helsley and Strange
(1990), whereby an increase in the number of agents trying to match improves the expected
quality of each match.36 Extending their framework to allow for labour market competition
introducesasecondsourceofagglomerationeconomies, wherebystrongercompetitionhelps
to save in ﬁxed costs by making the number of ﬁrms increase less than proportionately with the
labour force.
3.1.1 From ﬁrm-level to aggregate increasing returns
Consider an industry with an endogenously determined number of ﬁrms.37 Each ﬁrm
has the same technology as the intermediate producers of section 2.2, described by the
production function y(h) = βl(h) − α. However, in contrast to section 2.2, these ﬁrms are
now ﬁnal producers of a homogenous good (which we take as the numéraire) and have
horizontally differentiated skill requirements.38 There is a continuum of workers with
heterogenous skills each supplying one unit of labour. When a ﬁrm hires a worker that is
less than a perfect match for its skill requirement, there is a cost of mismatch borne by the
worker (one may think of this as a training cost). Each ﬁrm posts a wage so as to maximise
its proﬁts and each worker gets a job with the ﬁrm that offers him the highest wage net of
mismatch costs.
36Kim (1990) considers a similar matching structure in the context of a closed local labour market, and
in Kim (1991) he embeds this in an explicitly urban framework. The model in Kim (1990, 1991) and that in
Helsley and Strange (1990) differ mainly in terms of the wage setting mechanism.
37This can easily be extended to m sectors. However, given that in section 2.2 we already showed that hav-
ing m sectors and increasing returns at the sector and city level results in equilibrium urban specialisation,
there is little added value to considering more than one sector in this section as well.
38Electricity generation is an example of an industry producing a homogenous output using very different
techniques and workers.
23For simplicity, the skill space is taken to be the unit circle. Firms’ skill requirements are
evenly spaced around the unit circle.39 Workers’ skills are uniformly distributed on the
unit circle with density equal to the labour force L. If a worker’s skill differs from the skill
requirement of her employer by a distance z then the cost of mismatch, expressed in units
of the numéraire, is µz.
Suppose that n ﬁrms have entered the market. Because ﬁrms are symmetrically located
in skill space it makes sense to look for a symmetric equilibrium in which they all offer
the same wage w. Let us concentrate on the case in which there is full employment so
that ﬁrms are competing for workers. In this case each ﬁrm will effectively have only
two competitors, whose skill requirements are at a distance 1/n to its left and to its right.
A worker located at a distance z from ﬁrm h is indifferent between working for ﬁrm h
posting wage w(h) and working for h’s closest competitor posting wage w, where z is
deﬁned by







Firm h will thus hire any workers whose skill is within a distance z of its skill requirement
and have employment
l(h) = 2Lz =
L
n





its workforce above its proportionate labour market share (L/n). For any given wage
increase, the ﬁrm lures fewer workers away from its competitors the higher are mismatch
costs (µ), which make the ﬁrm a worse substitute for workers’ current employer, and the
lower is the density of workers in skill space (L).
Substituting (26) into the expression for ﬁrm h’s proﬁts, π(h) = [β − w(h)]l(h) − α,
differentiating the resulting concave function with respect to w(h), and then substituting
w(h) = w yields the equilibrium wage.40 This is equal to




Wages differ from workers’ marginal product (β) because ﬁrms have monopsony power.
At the same time, ﬁrms compete for workers and are forced to pay higher wages the
greater the number of competitors that they face (n). The intensity of labour market
39Maximal differentiation is usually imposed exogenously in this class of models. Evenly-spaced ﬁrm
locations have only been derived as an equilibrium outcome in this class of models in very special cases
because ﬁrm proﬁts are in general not a continuous function of locations and wages. See Economides
(1989) for a derivation of evenly-spaced ﬁrm locations as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the product
differentiation counterpart to this model with quadratic transportation costs.
40Note that a ﬁrm would be unable to make a proﬁt by deviating from this symmetric equilibrium with
a wage high enough to steal all workers from its closest competitors. Thus, proﬁts are continuous in wages
over the relevant range.








− α . (28)
By paying its L/n workers µ/n below their marginal product, each ﬁrm offsets its ﬁxed
cost α. Entry reduces individual ﬁrm proﬁts for two reasons. First, workers get split
between more ﬁrms — a market-crowding effect. Second, entry intensiﬁes competition
amongst ﬁrms for workers, forcing them to lower their wage margin — a competition
effect.






Using this expression, and given that at the symmetric equilibrium each ﬁrm employs
l = L/n workers, we can write aggregate production as








This obviously exhibits aggregate increasing returns to scale. What may be surprising is
that here the source of aggregate increasing returns is competition between ﬁrms. The mechanism
issimpleandfairlygeneral. Astheworkforce(L)grows, thenumberofﬁrmsincreasesless
than proportionately due to greater labour market competition — see (29). Consequently,
each ﬁrm ends up hiring more workers. In the presence of ﬁxed production costs, this
increases output per worker.
3.1.2 From output to income per worker
The concept of urban agglomeration economies is wider than that of increasing returns to scale in
the urban aggregate production function. The model in this section is a good illustration of
this. Individual utility increases with the size of the (local) labour force not only because
increased competition gives rise to aggregate increasing returns, but also because there is
a matching externality that further enhances income per worker.
To go from output to income per worker we need to incorporate mismatch costs.
Output per worker is obtained by dividing total output as given in (30) by the workforce.
The average worker has a skill that differs from its employer’s requirement by 1/4n, so
the average mismatch costs is µ/4n. Subtracting the average mismatch costs from output
per worker yields average income per worker as







25Average income per worker increases with the size of the workforce not only because
of the combination of labour market competition with ﬁxed production costs, but also
because there is a matching externality: as the workforce grows and the number of ﬁrms increases
the average worker is able to ﬁnd an employer that is a better match for its skill.
The presence of this matching externality implies that ﬁrm entry is socially beneﬁcial
so long as the marginal reduction in mismatch costs offsets the extra ﬁxed cost (i.e., so
long as µL/(4n2) > α). The fact that ﬁrms do not factor this into their entry decision
creates an inefﬁciency favouring too little entry. However, there is a second inefﬁciency
associated with ﬁrm entry working in the opposite direction. This arises because ﬁrms
entersolongastheycanlureenoughworkersawayfromtheircompetitorssoastorecover
the ﬁxed cost (i.e., by (28), so long as µL/n2 > α). Since ‘business stealing’ per se is
socially wasteful, this tends to produce excessive entry. In this particular speciﬁcation,
the business stealing inefﬁciency dominates so that in equilibrium there are too many
ﬁrms (twice as many as is socially desirable). However, excessive ﬁrm entry is not a
general outcome in this type of model. Instead it depends delicately on the details of
the speciﬁcation.41
3.1.3 Urban structure
Next, to embed the production structure we have just described in an urban context we
keep our earlier speciﬁcation of section 2.2 except for the commuting technology. The
only cost of commuting is now a monetary cost 2τ per unit of distance (τ > 0), so that
commuting costs for a worker living at a distance s from the cbd are 4τs.42 Now that
commuting costs are not incurred in working time, urban population is equal to the local
labour force (Ni = Li).
Since lot size is ﬁxed and commuting costs per unit of distance are independent of
income, every worker is willing to pay the same rent Ri(s) for a residence located at a
distance s from the cbd. The possibility of arbitrage across residences implies that in
equilibrium half of each city’s population lives at either side of the cbd and that the sum
of every dweller’s rent and the corresponding commuting costs is equal to the commuting
costs of someone living at the city edge: 4τs + Ri(s) = 4τ
Ni
2 . Thus, the rent function for
any worker in city i is Ri(s) = 2τ(Ni − 2|s|), which in this simple speciﬁcation increases
linearly as one approaches the cbd. Integrating this over the city’s extension yields total
41These two inefﬁciencies associated with ﬁrm entry correspond to the beneﬁts of increased variety versus
business stealing in the model of section 2.2. However, here the two corresponding inefﬁciencies do not
cancel out. At the same time, there is still no pricing inefﬁciency. Although here wages differ from workers’
marginal product, this does not create a distortion because labour supply is inelastic.
42Maintaining commuting costs incurred in labour time as in section 2.2 now that labour is heterogen-
eous would require dealing with more complex interactions between the housing and the labour markets
(Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou, 2002).






3.1.4 Equilibrium city sizes
Finally, we turn to the derivation of equilibrium city sizes. Let us assume that workers
allocate themselves across cities before ﬁrms enter.43 Further, let us require the equilib-
rium allocation of workers across cities to be such that no individual could achieve a
higher expected utility by locating elsewhere, and also require it to be stable with respect
to small perturbations. With free trade of the only ﬁnal good and risk neutral agents,
expected utility is an increasing function of expected consumption expenditure. Expected
consumption expenditure is equal to the average gross income per worker, as given by
(31), minus the sum of commuting cost and land rent expenditures (equal to 4τNi/2 for
every worker) plus the income from the individual share of local land rents (Ri/Ni, where
Ri is given by (32)), which simpliﬁes into






− τNi . (33)
From this we can see that individual consumption expenditure, and thus utility, is a








This city size is constrained efﬁcient, in the sense that it provides the highest level of
expected utility conditional on the number of ﬁrms being determined by free entry (which
we have shown above results in too many ﬁrms). The constrained-efﬁcient city size N∗ is the
result of a trade-off between urban agglomeration economies and urban crowding. N∗ decreases
with commuting costs as measured by τ and increases with the extent of aggregate in-
creasing returns as measured by αµ.44 Once again, in equilibrium all cities are of the same
size and this is not smaller than N∗.
However, unlike in the sharing model of section 2.2, a coordinating mechanism such
as competitive land developers is not enough to achieve efﬁciency, but only constrained
43This sequence of events ensures that workers can anticipate their expected mismatch but not the precise
value of this when they choose their city of residence. Alternatively, we could assume that before choosing
a city, workers know only the number of ﬁrms but not their exact location within each city.
44As the ﬁxed cost (α) and the mismatch cost (µ) increase, the ﬁxed cost savings from greater competition
and the matching externality both become more pronounced.
27efﬁciency. To achieve unconstrained efﬁciency one would need an instrument to restrain
ﬁrm entry.45
3.1.5 Alternative speciﬁcations
Although less popular than the basic sharing model explored in section 2.2, Helsley and
Strange’s (1990) urban version of Salop’s (1979) matching model has been extended in a
variety of directions and adapted to different situations. When commuting costs are paid
in labour time, Brueckner et al. (2002) show that complex interactions between the housing
and the labour markets occur. In an interesting contribution, Kim (1989) allows workers to
invest either in general human capital (which reduces the cost of mismatch) or in speciﬁc
human capital (which increases their skill-speciﬁc productivity). He shows that as the size
of the local market increases, the investment in speciﬁc human capital increases relative
to that in general human capital. This can be interpreted as increased specialisation with
city size. Tharakan and Tropeano (2001) and Amiti and Pissarides (2002) also use Salop’s
(1979) matching model but embed it in the regional framework proposed by Krugman
(1991a) rather than in a standard urban framework.
Helsley and Strange (1991) consider a two-period model where immobile capital must
be matched with entrepreneurs. When a project fails in the ﬁrst period, the bank re-
possesses the asset. A larger city then makes it easier to re-allocate this asset to an
alternative entrepreneur in the second period. This argument is further developed in
Zhang (2002) who uses an inﬁnite time horizon framework. As in Helsley and Strange
(1991), more available machines and more idle entrepreneurs in a city give rise to a thick
market externality leading to better matches between entrepreneurs and machines. Over
time, incumbent entrepreneurs go randomly out of business and are replaced by new
entrepreneurs. Reallocating idle machines between new entrants is costly and this cost
increaseswithtime. Consequently, reallocationtakesplaceonlyatcertaintimes(inwaves)
rather than at each period. This bunching mechanism is the dynamic counterpart of
spatial agglomeration. Furthermore, the two frictions interact together as larger markets
ﬁnd it worthwhile to have more frequent waves of reallocations. The main predictions
is that waves of reallocations should be more frequent and yield better results in larger
cities. InHelsleyandStrange(2002), urbanmatchingisexplicitlyadaptedtoaninnovation
context. They show how a dense network of suppliers in a city can facilitate innovation
by lowering the cost of developing new products.
45Since the efﬁcient number of ﬁrms is
p




2αµ < N∗. The result that the unconstrained-efﬁcient city size is less than the constrained-efﬁcient
size and thus than the equilibrium city size is not a general result. For an example of another matching
model of urban agglomeration economies where instead cities may be too small in equilibrium, see Berliant,
Reed, and Wang (2000), discussed in the following section.
28Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2002) explore a related agglomeration mechanism in
the context of competing auctions. They consider the simultaneous choice by buyers and
sellers between two competing markets. Following this location choice, buyers learn their
private valuations of the homogenous good and a uniform-price auction is held at each
location. They show that larger markets are more efﬁcient for a given buyer-to-seller
ratio. However, markets of different sizes may coexist in equilibrium if, as in Ellison and
Fudenberg (2003), relocation to the larger market reduces its attractiveness sufﬁciently.
In a recent contribution, Venables (2002) also argue that cities improve the quality of
matches. Their core argument, however, is very different from that in Helsley and Strange
(1990). In their model, workers (whose skills can be high or low) are randomly matched
with a local partner to produce. Their income equals one-half of the pair’s output. Both
low-skilled and high-skilled workers are more productive when matched with a high-
skilled partner than when matched with a low-skilled partner. However, the productive
gains from having a high-skilled partner are greater for high-skilled workers.
While efﬁciency in this context requires assortative matching, low-skilled workers have
no incentive to reveal their skill level. To induce them to do so, high-skilled workers may
ﬁnd it worthwhile to agglomerate in cities despite the additional costs that this entails.
The reason is the following. When all high-skilled workers live in cities and all low-skilled
workers live in the hinterland, a low-skilled worker who moved to the city would gain
half of the difference in output between a low-and-low skilled pair and a high-and-low
skilled pair. At the same time, she would have to incur the additional costs of living in
the city. If these additional costs are sufﬁciently large, low-skilled workers are better-off
staying in the hinterland. At the same time, if the complementarity between high-skilled
workers is sufﬁciently strong, they ﬁnd it advantageous to pay the costs of living in a
city where they can be matched with other high-skilled workers rather than live in the
hinterland and be matched with low-skilled workers. In other words, the crowding costs
associated with cities can act as a signalling device as in Spence (1973).46
46In a very different signalling model, DeCoster and Strange (1993) show that agglomeration can be the
result of a pooling rather than a separating equilibrium, unlike Venables (2002). In DeCoster and Strange
(1993) good entrepreneurs receive correlated signals about a few good locations, whereas bad entrepreneurs
receive uncorrelated signals that are not informative. Banks can use the location decision of an entrepreneur
to infer information about her quality and decide whether to ﬁnance her. Under some parameter values,
there is an equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs agglomerate at a focal point. This outcome is inefﬁcient
because the focal point is congested and likely to be a bad location. However, this is an equilibrium because
banks expect good entrepreneurs to cluster in the good locations and bad entrepreneurs to be dispersed.
Hence by agglomerating, bad entrepreneurs can avoid revealing their bad quality. Good entrepreneurs also
locate at the focal point because they do not want to be left alone in a (good) location where banks would
then infer that they are of bad quality. In this case, agglomeration is spurious.
293.2 Improving the chances of matching
In the previous section we have discussed models in which an increase in the number of
agents trying to match improves the expected quality of each match. Another possible
source of urban agglomeration economies based on a matching mechanism arises when
an increase in the number of agents trying to match improves the chances of matching. Urban
models exploring this second possibility incorporate elements from models of equilib-
rium unemployment in which job search and recruiting are subject to frictions (for recent
reviews see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The core
element of these models is an aggregate matching function that expresses the number of
job matches as a function of the number of unemployed job seekers and the number of
available job vacancies (or, more generally, matches as a function of the number of buyers
and sellers in the market).
It is common in the frictional search literature to present aggregate matching functions
as constructs similar to aggregate production functions. Such a comparison is particularly
helpful in the current context. Just like urban agglomeration economies can be related to a
local aggregate production function that exhibits increasing returns to scale, they can also
be related to a local aggregate matching function that exhibits increasing returns to scale.
A matching function subject to increasing returns is such that a proportional increase in
the number of job seekers and vacancies results in a more than proportional increase in the
number of job matches. In this case, an increase in the number of agents in a city reduces
search frictions and results in smaller proportions of unemployed workers and unﬁlled
vacancies. More generally, an increase in all inputs ensures that a smaller proportion of
these inputs remains idle. This results in a more than proportional increase in output even
when production takes place under constant returns to scale.47
Starting from an aggregate production function or an aggregate matching function may
be useful when the main objective is to explore some of the aggregate implications of
increasing returns in aggregate production or in aggregate matching.48 However, when
the aim is to understand the microeconomic underpinnings of urban increasing returns,
it is essential to understand how aggregate production or aggregate matching follow
from individual behaviour. There are various approaches to providing micro-foundations
47In a different vein and following Stahl (1982a,b) and Wolinsky (1983), this type of argument has been
used in the shopping literature to model shopping externalities and the clustering of retail outlets. The
modelling options however are quite different from those used here. See Schulz and Stahl (1996) for a more
recent contribution and a discussion of this literature.
48Aggregate matching functions have been widely used in urban economics to analyse the spatial mis-
match hypothesis. According to this, adverse economic outcomes for minorities are caused by the mismatch
between their residential location and the location of jobs. A possible explanation is that workers located
far from jobs experience a higher cost of job search and a lower pay-off when ﬁnding a job. In equilibrium,
they search less intensely and are thus less likely to ﬁnd a job. See Gobillon, Selod, and Zenou (2003) for a
comprehensive survey on these issues.
30for an aggregate matching function. However, most of them do not yield an aggregate
matching function with increasing returns to scale.49
The ﬁrst and most common approach relies on uncoordinated random matching by
agents (early examples are Butters, 1977, Hall, 1979, Pissarides, 1979, and Peters, 1991).
A typical motivation for this random-search approach is that workers need to apply for a
single job knowing where vacancies are but not knowing which particular vacancies other
workers will apply to ﬁll. When workers use identical mixed strategies to choose where
to apply, some vacancies receive applications from several workers and all applicants
but one to each of those vacancies remain unemployed, while other vacancies receive
no application and remain unﬁlled. Let V denote the stock of available vacancies and U
denote the stock of unemployed workers. Suppose that all vacancies are equally attractive
to every worker.50 Then the probability that an unemployed worker applies to any given
vacancy is 1/V, so the probability that a vacancy receives no applications is (1 − 1/V)U.
Thus the aggregate matching function expressing the expected number of matches as a
function of the stock of vacancies and unemployed workers is
M(U,V) = V[1− (1− 1/V)U] . (35)
This aggregate matching function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. The intensity of
decreasing returns falls as the number of vacancies and unemployed workers increases,
approaching constant returns to scale as a limiting case. The source of matching frictions
in this case is the lack of coordination amongst workers in deciding where to send their
application.
A second approach to providing micro-foundations for an aggregate matching function
is that of Lagos (2000), who shows how search frictions can arise endogenously when
agentschoosetheirlocationtobettertargettheirsearch. However, onceagaintheresulting
matching function exhibits constant returns to scale.
A third approach, pioneered by Coles (1994) and Coles and Smith (1998), instead yields
naturally a matching function with increasing returns to scale. Consider an unemployed
worker who can simultaneously apply to all job vacancies that may suit her. In the ﬁrst
instance, the worker applies to the entire stock of available vacancies. Suppose that there
is an exogenous probability ψ that a certain applicant-vacancy pairing is unacceptable.
Then with probability ψV all of these initial applications get rejected, and from then on
the worker applies only to new vacancies as they are opened. Similarly, a new vacancy
49This is often seen as a desirable property in the labour literature. However, some contributions (e.g.,
Diamond, 1982) explore the macroeconomic implications of a matching function with increasing returns.
50In a fully-speciﬁed model, this depends on the wages offered with each vacancy. Firms anticipate
frictions when setting their wages by trading off ex-post proﬁts against attracting at least one applicant
(see Burdett, Shi, and Wright, 2001, and Coles and Eeckhout, 2003, for discussions of price-setting in these
models).
31receives applications from the entire stock of workers. With probability ψU none of these
initial applications result in a suitable pairing, and from then on the vacancy only receives
applications from newly unemployed workers. If new vacancies and unemployed work-
ers arrive in continuous time, the total number of matches is then the sum of matches
between the ﬂow of vacancies v and the stock of unemployed workers U and of matches
between the ﬂow of unemployed workers u and the stock of vacancies V:
M(U,V) = v(1− ψU) + u(1− ψV) . (36)
This aggregate matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale in the stocks and the
ﬂows. The intuition is simple: in a market with more job opportunities that can be explored
simultaneously it is less likely that none of them work out.
A matching function exhibiting increasing returns captures the idea that in a large city
peoplehavemoreoptions. However, animmediateimplicationofthisisthattheywillalso
become more choosy.51 Berliant et al. (2000) provide a particularly insightful formalisation
of this implication. They begin with an aggregate matching function subject to increasing
returns, but reinterpret it as a ‘meetings function’ where meetings do not always result
in a match. Agents are heterogenous and become more productive when matched with
someone that is neither too similar nor too different from them (if agents are too similar
they have little to learn from each other, whereas if they are too different they have trouble
understanding each other).
Urban agglomeration economies in Berliant et al. (2000) arise from an appealing com-
bination of the mechanism discussed in this section (an increase in the number of agents
trying to match improves the chances of matching) and a mechanism related to the one
discussed in the previous section (an increase in the number of agents trying to match
improves the expected quality of each match).52 Increasing returns in the aggregate
meetings function imply that a rise in population raises the meeting rate. Knowing that
the probability of ﬁnding other unmatched agents is higher in locations with a larger
population, agents will be more selective when deciding whether or not to accept a match.
Thus, an increase in population, by increasing the probability of ﬁnding a match, also
allows agents to require a higher quality of matches. At the same time, agents are less
selective than is socially efﬁcient. This is because they do not take into account that by
accepting pairings more readily they contribute to reducing the number of unmatched
agents and make it more difﬁcult for everyone else to ﬁnd a suitable partner. Berliant et al.
(2000) show that when this inefﬁciency is large enough cities may be too small relative
51In terms of equation (36), this implies that the probability ψ that a given pairing does not result in a
successful match ought to be endogenous and decreasing in the matching rate.
52See Sato (2001) for another recent contribution that combines a matching function with a quality story.
32to the efﬁcient size.53 As usual, in-migrants do not consider the negative crowding effect
that they inﬂict to the other residents. This causes cities to be too large. At the same
time, the inefﬁciency that arises from agents not being selective enough works in the
opposite direction by reducing the level of utility for a given city size, which tends to make
utility in the city equal outside utility for a smaller city size. Depending on the relative
magnitude of these two externalities, in equilibrium cities may be either too large or too
small relative to what would be chosen by a city planner who could set both population
and selectiveness in matching.
3.3 Mitigating hold-up problems
Bilateral relationships between buyers and suppliers or between employers and employ-
ees are often plagued by hold-up problems that ﬁnd their root in contractual incomplete-
ness and relationship-speciﬁc investments. When contracts are incomplete and subject to
ex-post renegotiation, and one or both parties of a bilateral relationship need to make an
ex-ante relationship-speciﬁc investment, the investor may be held up at the renegotiation
stage by the other party. Ex-ante, the prospect of being held-up ex-post discourages so-
cially proﬁtable investments (for discussions of the hold-up problem, see Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian, 1978, Williamson, 1985, Hart, 1995).
If the parties can switch to an alternative partner at the renegotiation stage and extract
value from their ex-ante investments, hold-up problems are less of an issue. In an urban
context, it may be argued that cities, by hosting a large number of potential partners,
can help mitigate hold-up problems. Stated differently, asset speciﬁcity is likely to be less
of an issue in an environment where the number of potential partners is large. This type of
idea has been recently explored in an urban and regional setting (Rotemberg and Saloner,
2000, Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud, 2002) as well as in an international trade context
(McLaren, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002a). See in particular McLaren (2000) for a
lucid discussion of the issue. The formulation below is based on Matouschek and Robert-
Nicoud (2002).
53In deriving this result, Berliant et al. (2000) determine equilibrium city sizes using an ‘open-city’
approach rather than the ‘systems-of-cities’ approach discussed in section 2.2. This open-city approach
amountstotakingtheprevailingutilitylevelintheeconomyasgivenandlookingatasinglecityinisolation.
Instead of having migration take place across cities until utility is equalised, migration into or out of the
single city being considered takes place until the local utility level equals the exogenous utility level in the
rest of the economy. (See Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2004, in this volume for further discussion). As in the
systems-of-cities approach, in the open-city approach there is a tendency for cities to be too large relative
to what is socially efﬁcient. This can be seen by looking back at ﬁgure 1. If the level marked ‘equilibrium
utility’ is what can be achieved elsewhere and is below the level of utility that would be achieved with an
efﬁcient size of this city, migration into the city will continue after the utility of the representative agent
tips over its maximum level and will only stop when the level of utility in the city falls to that attainable
elsewhere.
33Consider an industry with two (discrete) ﬁrms and a continuum of workers of mass
2. Firms produce under decreasing returns to scale a homogeneous good according to a
non-stochastic version of the production function of equation (17):




where l(h) is the effective labour supplied to ﬁrm h and γ measures the intensity of
decreasing returns.
To supply labour, workers need to make a human capital investment. As usual in this
literature, this investment is assumed to be observable but not veriﬁable by outsiders.
That is, ﬁrms can see how much workers have invested but workers’ investments cannot
be contracted upon because no court could certify them in case of disagreement.
By investing to attain a level of human capital k at a cost k/2 per unit, a worker is able
to supply l = φk units of effective labour.54 The consumption expenditure of a worker
investing k and thus providing φk units of effective labour is given by:







where w is the wage per unit of effective labour and k2/2 is the cost of the investment.
Thetimingisasfollows. First, eachﬁrmchoosesitslocation. Then, eachworkerdecides
on her level of investment and also chooses a location. Finally, each ﬁrm makes a take-it-
or-leave-it wage offer to each worker it wishes to employ at the same location.55
This model can be solved by a straightforward backward induction argument. When
ﬁrms choose separate locations at the ﬁrst stage, they can exploit their monopsony power
at the third stage and offer workers their reservation wage (normalised to zero). An-
ticipating this, at the second stage workers are indifferent between locations and make
no investment in human capital so that k = 0. As result, ﬁrms make no proﬁt. This is
the standard hold-up problem: ﬁrms cannot commit to reward workers when they invest.
Workers are left at their outside option, which is independent of their skills. Consequently
they do not invest and no surplus is created.
When instead ﬁrms choose the same location at the ﬁrst stage, they compete in wages
at the third stage. In this case, workers are paid at their marginal product in equilibrium.
54We consider here the particular case of an employee making a human capital investment. Using the
same model, we could think instead of a supplier making an investment to raise quality. In addition, as
in McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002b), it may be possible to argue that this investment
could be made in-house by the buyer, albeit less efﬁciently than when out-sourced to a supplier. This
type of additional assumption would allow us to derive results regarding the internal organisation of ﬁrms
depending on their environment.
55Considering instead that any surplus is shared between worker and ﬁrm would make the results less
stark but would not alter their nature.
34Using (37), the wage is given by:
w(h) = β − γl(h) . (39)
Inserting this equation into (38) and maximising consumption expenditure with respect
to the investment made by each worker at the second stage, we ﬁnd this to be:
k = φw = φ[β − γl(h)] . (40)
All workers choose the location where ﬁrms are located and in equilibrium the labour
market clears, so that l(h) = φk in each ﬁrm. Inserting this into (40) yields:
k =
φβ
1+ γφ2 . (41)
Wage competition forces ﬁrms to pay workers at their marginal product. Ex-ante, the pro-
spect of higher rewards encourages workers to invest in human capital. More generally,
competition between ﬁrms in the same location gives workers an outside option, which
depends (unlike in the case where ﬁrms locate separately) positively on their skills and
thus favours investment. In other words, the decision by ﬁrms to agglomerate acts as device to
credibly commit to pay their workers. After replacement in (38) and the proﬁt of ﬁrms, it can
be veriﬁed that all parties make a positive surplus in equilibrium.
As made clear by this model, when non-contractible investments are undertaken by
the long side of the market (workers in this speciﬁcation), agglomeration mitigates the
hold-up problem. However, Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2002) also show that ag-
glomeration can worsen the hold-up problem when non-contractible investments have to be made
by the short side of the market (ﬁrms in this speciﬁcation). This is because agglomeration, by
reducing the rents of ﬁrms, also reduces their marginal incentive to increase these rents.
The main weakness of the above model is that because of the extreme nature of wage
competition, no more than two ﬁrms are needed to eliminate the hold-up problem.
However, it is easy to imagine weaker forms of wage competition (as in the model of
wage competition presented in section 3.2) where the hold-up problem would diminish
gradually with the number of ﬁrms.56 It may also be interesting to enrich this model
and consider that workers could choose the degree of speciﬁcity of their human capital
investment, as in Kim (1989) or more recently Grossman and Helpman (2002b).
4. Learning
Learning in a broad sense (encompassing schooling, training, and research) is a very im-
portant activity both in terms of the resources devoted to it and in terms of its contribution
56In this respect, the model developed by Helsley and Strange (1991) could provide a simple framework
in which these issues could be embedded.
35to economic development. According to Jovanovic (1997), modern economies devote
more than 20% of their resources to learning. A fundamental feature of learning is that
in many (if not most) cases, it is not a solitary activity taking place in a void. Instead
it involves interactions with others and many of these interactions have a ’face-to-face’
nature. Cities, by bringing together a large number of people, may thus facilitate learning.
Put differently, the learning opportunities offered by the cities could provide a strong
justiﬁcation for their own existence.
Learning mechanisms have received a substantial share of attention in descriptive
accounts of agglomeration in cities. Marshall (1890) already emphasised how cities favour
the diffusion of innovations and ideas.57 Following Jacobs (1969), numerous authors have
stressed how the environment offered by cities improves the prospects for generating new
ideas. Moreover, the advantages of cities for learning regard not only cutting-edge techno-
logies, but also the acquisition of skills and ’everyday’ incremental knowledge creation,
diffusion, and accumulation (knowing how, knowing who, etc.), as suggested by Lucas
(1988). There is also substantial body of empirical evidence regarding the advantages of
cities for learning (see the chapters by Audretsch and Feldman, 2004, by Moretti, 2004,
and by Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, in this volume). Despite all of this, agglomera-
tion mechanisms directly dealing with learning have received much less attention in the
theoretical literature than the sharing and matching mechanisms discussed in previous
sections. Nevertheless, therehavebeenafewkeycontributions. Inthissection, weexplore
some of these while taking the opportunity to highlight the need for further work in this
area. Forthepurposesofpresentation, weclassifylearningmechanismsintothosedealing
with knowledge generation, knowledge diffusion, and knowledge accumulation.
4.1 Knowledge generation
Following Jacobs (1969), a key issue regarding the generation of knowledge in cities is the
role that diversiﬁed urban environments play in facilitating search and experimentation
in innovation. Duranton and Puga (2001b) develop microeconomic foundations for such
a role, building a model that justiﬁes the coexistence of diversiﬁed and specialised cities
and the agglomeration of ﬁrms at different stages of their life-cycle in cities of each type.58
The model builds on the standard input-sharing model described in section 2.2. As in
thatmodel, thecostofusingagivenproductionprocessdiminishesasmorelocalﬁrmsuse
57As highlighted by Marshall (1890, iv.x.3): ‘Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improve-
ments in machinery, in process and the general organisation of the business have their merits promptly
discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their
own; and thus becomes the source of further new ideas.’
58Asintheproduct-cycleliteratureandinarmed-banditmodelsoflearning, inDurantonandPuga(2001b)
ﬁrms learn from their environment. A crucial difference, however, is that in Duranton and Puga (2001b) the
environment is endogenous and itself shaped by ﬁrms’learning strategies.
36the same type of process because they can share intermediate suppliers. At the same time,
urban crowding places a limit on city size and consequently on how many processes can
be widely used in a city. We have already discussed these ingredients formally and shown
that the combination of localisation economies with congestion costs creates static advantages to
urban specialisation.
The main novelty of Duranton and Puga (2001b) is the simple model of process in-
novation that they build on top of the standard input-sharing model. They start from the
assumption that a young ﬁrm needs a period of experimentation to realise its full potential
— the entrepreneur may have a project, but may not know all the details of the product to
be made, what components to use, or what kind of workers to hire. There are m possible
ways to implement this project, but one is better than all others. This ideal production
process, which differs across ﬁrms, is initially unknown. A ﬁrm can try to discover it
by making a prototype with any one of the types of processes already used locally. If this
process is not the right one, the ﬁrm can try different alternatives. Once a ﬁrm identiﬁes its
ideal process, which happens after using this process for a prototype or after exhausting
all other possibilities, it can begin mass-production of its product. The combination of this
learning process that draws from local types of production processes with costly ﬁrm relocation
creates dynamic advantages to urban diversity.
As in section 2.2, new cities can be created by competitive developers and migration
makes workers in all cities equally well-off. Finally, ﬁrm turnover is introduced by having
some ﬁrms randomly close down each period. Optimal investment then ensures they
are replaced by new ﬁrms producing new products. Duranton and Puga (2001b) derive
a set of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a conﬁguration in which diversiﬁed and
specialised cities coexist to be a steady-state. They then show that the same conditions
guarantee that this steady-state is stable and unique.
When diversiﬁed and specialised cities coexist, it is because each ﬁrm ﬁnds it in its best
interest to locate in a diversiﬁed city while searching for its ideal process, and later to
relocate to a specialised city where all ﬁrms are using the same type of process. Location
in a diversiﬁed city during a ﬁrm’s learning stage can be seen as an investment. It is
costly because all ﬁrms impose congestion costs on each other, but only those using the
same type of process create cost-reducing static agglomeration economies. This results in
comparativelyhigherproductioncostsindiversiﬁedcities. However, bearingthesehigher
costs can be worthwhile for ﬁrms in search of their ideal process because they expect to
have to try a variety of processes before ﬁnding their ideal one, and a diversiﬁed city
allows them to do so without costly relocation after each trial. In this sense, diversiﬁed
cities act as a ‘nursery’ for ﬁrms. Once a ﬁrm ﬁnds its ideal production process, it no
longer beneﬁts from being in a diverse environment. At this stage, if relocation is not too
costly, the ﬁrm avoids the congestion imposed by the presence of ﬁrms using different
37types of processes by relocating to a city where all ﬁrms share its specialisation.
4.2 Knowledge diffusion
4.2.1 The transmission of skills and ideas
In this section, we ﬁrst present a model of skill transmission inspired by Jovanovic and
Rob (1989), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995), and Glaeser (1999). The basic idea is that
proximity to individuals with greater skills or knowledge facilitates the acquisition of
skills and the exchange and diffusion of knowledge. The rest of the literature is discussed
below.
Consider overlapping generations of risk-neutral individuals who live for two periods.
We refer to them as young in the ﬁrst period and as old in the second period of their life.
Time is discrete and the time horizon inﬁnite. For simplicity there is no time discounting,
no population growth, and no altruism between generations. Hence, each consumer’s
objective function is to maximise her expected lifetime consumption of the sole homogen-
eous good, which is used as numéraire.
Workers can be skilled or unskilled, and this affects their productivity: the output of an
unskilled worker is β whereas that of a skilled worker is β, where β > β. This productivity
difference translates into wages because workers get paid their marginal product. Every
worker is unskilled at birth, but can try to become skilled when young and, if successful,
can use those skills when old.
Geography plays a crucial role in the acquisition of skills. At each period, each indi-
vidual chooses whether to live in isolation in the hinterland or to live with other workers
in one of many cities. As in Jovanovic and Rob (1989), let us assume that workers can only
become skilled after some successful face-to-face interactions with skilled workers. Hence
living in a city when young is necessary (but not sufﬁcient) to acquire skills. Assume also
that cities with a large skilled population offer better learning opportunities. Formally, the
probability of becoming skilled in city i is given by the (exogenous) probability distribu-
tion function f(NS
i ), where NS
i is the number of skilled workers in the city, with f 0 > 0
and f 00 < 0. Ignoring time indices for simplicity, denote Vi the (endogenous) value of
becoming skilled in city i, which is explicitly derived below. As Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1995) and Glaeser (1999), we assume that skilled workers are able to charge unskilled
workers for the transmission of skills. For simplicity, assume that the surplus created
when a young worker acquires skills, Vi, is split equally between the young and the old
worker. Consequently, any young worker acquiring skills transfers Vi/2 to the old worker
who taught him.
Note that cities provide no beneﬁt other than better opportunities for learning. Young
workers may be lured into cities to acquire skills, whereas old skilled workers may remain
38in cities because of the rents they can receive from transmitting their skills.59 On the
other hand, living in cities is more costly than living in the hinterland. The internal urban
structure is as in section 3.1 with commuting costs paid in ﬁnal output. The cost of living
in city i is thus τNi where total population is the sum of its skilled and unskilled workers:
Ni = NS
i + NU
i . Living in the hinterland, on the other hand, involves no commuting or
housing costs. Hence living in a city when young can be viewed as a risky investment in human
capital: it always involves higher living costs but only in some cases does it improve one’s skills
and income when old.
We use a pair of sub-indices to denote the locations chosen by a worker in each of the
two periods of her life, with subindex H used for the hinterland and subindex i used
for city i. The consumption expenditure of a worker living in the hinterland throughout
her life is cH,H = 2β, since she has no chance of becoming skilled there. The consumption
expenditure of this worker is higher than that of a worker living ﬁrst in the hinterland and
then moving to city i, since such a worker will not become skilled when young and thus
will not be able to use her skills while living in a city when old: cH,H > cH,i = 2β − τNi.
A worker who spends her youth in city i, is unsuccessful in acquiring skills, and moves
to the hinterland when old, enjoys a consumption expenditure of cU
i,H = 2β − τNi. If
this worker instead lives in city j when old, she gets a lower consumption expenditure
cU
i,j = 2β − τNi − τNj < cU
i,H. Thus, old workers who are unskilled, either because they
spent their youth in the hinterland or because they were unsuccessful in acquiring skills
despite living in a city when young, are better-off in the hinterland. Consequently, in
equilibrium, all unskilled workers in every city are young.
A worker who spends her youth in city i, is successful at acquiring skills, and moves to
the hinterland when old, has a consumption expenditure of
cS
i,H = β −
Vi
2
− τNi + β . (42)
Finally, a worker who spends her youth in city i, acquires skills, and lives in city j when
old has an expected consumption expenditure equal to
E(cS
i,j) = β −
Vi
2












j is the expected number of young unskilled worker that this worker
expects to pass her skills to. Comparison of equations (42) and (43) shows the trade-off for
59Alternatively, in the spirit of Jovanovic and Rob (1989), one could assume that meetings between skilled
and unskilled workers may lead to imitation by the latter whereas meetings between skilled workers may
lead to skill development (or knowledge creation) caused for instance by the re-combination of ideas. This
alternative mechanism would also provide skilled workers with incentives to stay in cities, provided that
the expected beneﬁts of further skill development are not dominated by the costs of imitation.
39askilledworker: bymovingtothehinterlandshesavesinlivingcostsbuthastorelinquish
the rents associated with training unskilled workers.
We now derive a set of conditions for the existence and stability of a steady-state
in which all cities are identical in terms of their size and of their proportion of skilled
workers, all young workers live in cities, all old skilled workers remain in cities, and
all old unskilled workers move to the hinterland.60 With all cities being identical, we can
drop subindices for speciﬁc cities from the strictly urban variables Vi, NS
i , and NU
i , and use
a common subindex C for all cities in the variables denoting the consumption expenditure
of workers. In steady-state, the skilled population remains constant so that each skilled
worker expects to teach one unskilled. This implies NS = NU f(NS). The value of being
skilled, V, can then be calculated as:
V = E(cS
C,C) − cU
C,H = β − β − τN . (44)
In order to have a steady-state as described above, young workers must prefer living in
a city over living in the hinterland. This requires f(NS)E(cS
C,C) + [1− f(NS)]cU
C,H > cH,H.
After replacement and simpliﬁcation, this yields:
f(NS)(β − β − τN) ≥ τN . (45)
It must also be the case that old skilled workers prefer to remain in cities over moving to
the hinterland. This requires E(cS
C,C) ≥ cS
C,H. After replacement of equations (42) and (43)
this implies V/2 ≥ τN. Replacing V from equation (44) yields
β − β ≥ 3τN . (46)
Condition (45) implies that the probability of learning, f(NS), multiplied by the beneﬁts
from learning, β − β − τN, must offset the extra cost of living in cities while trying to
acquire skills, τN. Condition (46) stipulates that the beneﬁts from teaching unskilled
workers must be sufﬁciently large to compensate the higher cost of urban living for the
skilled. It is easy to see that when the productivity difference between the skilled and the
unskilled workers, β − β, is sufﬁciently large, there exists an urban population N which
satisﬁes these two conditions.
We must also check the stability of this steady-state with respect to small perturba-
tions in the distribution of (skilled and unskilled) workers across cities. The entry of
60This differs signiﬁcantly from Glaeser (1999), who focuses on the case of a single city with ’surplus’
skilled labour. In his setting, all the beneﬁts from learning for each generation are exhausted in urban
crowding. A second difference that results from the ﬁrst one is that in Glaeser (1999) the value of being
skilled is exogenous, whereas here it depends on city size (see equation 44). In a related paper, Peri
(2002) explores learning in a two-location framework. However, his paper has a more macroeconomic
focus than Glaeser’s and assumes that learning is a technological externality for which he provides no
micro-foundations.
40more unskilled workers in a city always reduces their expected consumption income,
β − τN + f(NS)V/2. This is because further entry by unskilled workers increases the
costs of urban live τN and also reduces the value of becoming skilled V. Regarding the
entry of more skilled workers in a city, this reduces their expected consumption income,












(β − β − τN) − 3τ < 0 . (47)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side captures the effects of changes in the number of
unskilled workers that each skilled worker expects to train (made up of a positive effect
due to the higher proportion of successful apprentices and a negative effect due to having
successful apprentices split between a larger number of skilled workers). The second
term on the right-hand side is the negative effect of the higher congestion costs (including
both the direct cost and the indirect cost operating through the reduction in the value
of being skilled). This condition is satisﬁed provided that the learning function f(.) is
sufﬁciently concave, so that f 0(.) falls rapidly with the number of skilled workers. To
ensure the stability of city sizes, we also need to check the effects of pairwise deviations
in the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers. For the relevant Jacobian to be negative
deﬁnite, so that the steady-state is stable, we require
τNf(NS)[2+ f(NS)] − NS[2(NU − NS)τ + (β − β − τN)f(NS)]f 0(NS) > 0 (48)
as well as the condition of equation (47). Once again, these will be satisﬁed provided that
f(.) is sufﬁciently concave.
To summarise these conditions, provided that the productivity advantage of being
skilled is sufﬁciently large and that the probability of learning is a sufﬁciently concave
function of the skilled population in the city, there exists a steady-state where all cities
are identical in terms of their size and of their proportion of skilled workers, all young
workers choose to live in cities to try to acquire skills, and all skilled workers remain in
cities to transmit their skills. This result relies entirely on the assumption that one can only
learn in cities and that the probability of learning is an increasing function of the number
of local skilled workers (f 0(NS) > 0). That cities offer better learning opportunities was
directlyassumedratherthanderivedfromawell-speciﬁedmicro-structure. Glaeser(1999)
goes a bit further by suggesting some micro-foundations inspired by Jovanovic and Rob
(1989) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995). Since those frameworks do not exhibit any scale
effect, Glaeser (1999) assumes that the number of meetings between skilled and unskilled
workers every period increases with city size. As he makes clear, his objective is to
explore the consequences of this assumption rather than to justify it. In practice, urban
41congestion may in fact reduce the number and quality of interactions. How to provide
good micro-foundations for f(NS) with f 0(NS) > 0 remains an open question.61
4.2.2 The diffusion of information and knowledge
Turning to the slightly different issue of the diffusion of information (as opposed to skills)
and its relation to cities, two relevant strands of literature must be discussed.
There is a signiﬁcant literature on social learning with strong micro-foundations (see
Vives, 1996, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998, Sobel, 2000, for recent surveys).
This literature is often motivated by examples that are speciﬁcally spatial in nature, like
the agglomeration of diners in certain restaurants, the propagation of rumours in cities,
the adoption of fertilisers by some farmers and not others, and word-of-mouth learning in
neighbourhoods. These models have two crucial properties. First, following Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) is the possibility of inefﬁcient
herding. Assume that ﬁrms need to make some investment, say in capacity. Demand is
uncertain (e.g., it can be high or low) and each ﬁrm privately receives a noisy signal about
this. Firms sequentially make their investment with knowledge of previous decisions.
The ﬁrst ﬁrm decides on the basis of its own signal only. Then, the second ﬁrm uses not
only its own signal but also the information it infers from what the ﬁrst ﬁrm did, etc. If the
ﬁrst two ﬁrms receive the wrong signal, they both make the wrong decision. Then, even
if the third ﬁrm receives the good signal, it rationally chooses to discard it and makes
the wrong investment. This is because this ﬁrm realises that the other two ﬁrms have
received a different signal. This carries more weight than its own signal. Obviously any
ﬁrm thereafter will also make the wrong decision.
The second important property of social learning models is the possibility of strategic
delays. When making the timing of decisions endogenous, Chamley and Gale (1994) show
that no-one wants to ’take the plunge’ and invest ﬁrst. The reason being that when ﬁrms
expect the others to decide quickly, they ﬁnd it proﬁtable to wait so that they can learn
from their decisions. Observable decisions lead to an informational externality, whereby
waiting has a positive option value.
When the timing is exogenous, there are no scale effects. In most cases the decision is
crystallised after a few periods, regardless of the number of players. Models with en-
dogenous timing are more promising in this respect. However, their precise implications
with respect to the number of players still need to be worked out precisely.
There is also a literature modelling urban land use under spatial informational extern-
alities. This second literature stands in sharp contrast with the social learning literature in
61In this respect, the meeting function in Glaeser (1999) could be given microeconomic foundations along
the lines used to derive matching functions with increasing returns described in section 3.2, possibly also
incorporating the distinction between meetings and matches explored in Berliant et al. (2000).
42that the spatial modelling is very detailed but the externality takes a fairly ad-hoc form.
Following Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Imai (1982), the primary purpose is to derive
endogenously the existence of a Central Business District (cbd). This literature typically
assumes that productivity in location s is a function of the density of economic activity
at various locations weighted by a decay function. More precisely output is assumed to
be the product of a standard production function multiplied by an externality term equal
to the sum of output in other locations weighted by a decay function. Denote by Ys the






where β(ls,rs) is a constant returns to scale production function with labour (l) and land (r)
as inputs.
R
g(s,s0)b[Y(s0)]ds0 is the externality, where g(s,s0) is the spatial decay function
which decreases in the distance between locations s and s0 and b[Y(s0)] is the density of
ﬁrms at s0. Thisfunction exhibits obviousincreasingreturns to scaleat the citylevel. These
stem from an increase in the number of ﬁrms either through a higher density or a physical
expansion of the city.62
In Fujita and Ogawa (1982), this type of speciﬁcation yields a rich set of possible
outcomes. Depending on the importance of the spatial decay function g(s,s0) relative to
commuting costs, many urban conﬁgurations are possible, from a purely monocentric city
to complete dispersion. Cities experience a transition from a monocentric to a multicentric
structure and then to complete dispersion as the spatial decay weakens. This type of
model has been extended by Helsley (1990), Ota and Fujita (1993), Lucas (2001), Berliant,
Peng, and Wang (2002), and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002).
None of these papers offers much detail regarding the information externality nor the
spatial decay function as modelled in equation (49). In his discussion of the issue, Helsley
(1990) argues that the knowledge produced in a location is a by-product of output as in
Arrow (1962). Hence (49) can be viewed as a reduced form for a knowledge diffusion
process, whereby knowledge diffuses through contacts between ﬁrms whose costs rises
with distance.63 Alternatively, Helsley (1990) suggests that knowledge could be in part
62In Beckmann (1976) and Papageorgiou and Smith (1983), a similar spatial decay function is used to
analyse the utility beneﬁts derived from locating closer to other individuals. Such utility gains are argued
to accrue from direct non-economic interactions between urban dwellers.
63In this respect, Tauchen and Witte (1984) extend O’Hara (1977)’s ﬁrm location model where each ﬁrm
consumes one unit of space in the cbd by allowing for ’contacts’ between them. Contacts between any
two ﬁrms have a cost, which depends on their distance. The volume of bilateral contacts V also brings an
unspeciﬁed gain f(V). Firms can choose optimally their volume of contact with each of the other ﬁrms.
More speciﬁcally, Kim (1988) shows that if the gains from contacts are of the form f(V) = V − V logV
and transport costs are linear, the reduced form for the ﬁrm production function is equivalent to (49) with
g(s,S0) = e−|s−s0|.
43location-speciﬁc.64 However, these arguments can only be viewed as a ﬁrst step towards
a fully-ﬂedged micro-founded model of the diffusion of knowledge in cities with good
micro-foundations for both the informational externality and its spatial decay.
Despite their lack of detailed micro-foundations, by focusing on agglomeration at the
sub-city level, these models highlight a series of fundamental issues that have so far
received insufﬁcient attention. Improving our understanding of such issues will require
much more than mechanically translating existing micro-foundations into a smaller spa-
tial scale. Firstly, because one must deal with distinct questions, such as the allocation of
land within a city across residential, commercial, and non-urban uses. Secondly, because
the forces driving agglomeration at small spatial scales may be quite different from those
driving agglomeration at the city level.
4.3 Knowledge accumulation
Like all growth models, models of knowledge accumulation build on two crucial sets of
equations describing (i) the production of the different goods and (ii) the accumulation
of factors. The theoretical literature on growth in cities has added speciﬁc urban features
to both the production and the accumulation equations. In what follows, contributions
related to each of these two modelling elements are examined in turn.
4.3.1 Dynamic effects of static externalities
Following Romer (1986) and Palivos and Wang (1996), the easiest option is to assume that
ﬁnal producers face individually constant returns to scale but aggregate increasing returns
toscale, andthatﬁnaloutputcanbedirectlyaccumulated(whenitisnotconsumed). More
speciﬁcally assume a homogeneous ﬁnal good produced using human capital and labour.






where Ki is aggregate human capital in city i, Li is net labour, and β(Ki) is a productivity
parameter subject to an externality from aggregate human capital. With commuting costs
paid in units of time (as in section 2.2), net labour as a function of city population, Ni,
is equal to Li = Ni(1 − τNi) where τ represents commuting costs. Since in equilibrium
ﬁrms make no proﬁt and factor owners all live in the city, aggregate output in city i can
be divided directly between aggregate consumption, Ci, and savings. Savings can then be
64In a different vein Combes and Duranton (2001) and Fosfuri and Rønde (2002) consider that knowledge
is embedded in workers and diffuses only when workers move between ﬁrms. In this type of setting, the
strong localised aspect of knowledge spill-overs is easily justiﬁed by the propensity of workers to change
jobs within the same local labour market.
44transformed into human capital at no cost so that:
˙ Ki = Yi − Ci , (51)
where ˙ Ki denotes the variation in the stock of human capital in city i.
To get sustained growth, assume that the externality inﬂuencing the productivity para-
meter is such that β(Ki) = K
γ
i .65 Hence, even though each worker faces decreasing
returns to the accumulation of human capital, the city as a whole does not thanks to this
externality in Ki. After replacement, aggregate output in city i is given by
Yi = N
1+γ
i (1− τNi)γki , (52)
where ki ≡ Ki/Ni is the average human capital per worker in the city. Workers save a
constant fraction δ of their income at each period.66 With all cities being symmetric in







= δ[Ni(1− τNi)]γ . (53)
Note that in this framework, growth is driven only by the externality in the city pro-
duction function: β(Ki) = K
γ
i . This externality plays two roles at the same time: engine of
growth and agglomeration force, which justiﬁes the existence of cities. Note also that the
accumulation side of the model, described by equation (51), is completely passive. Hence
weareinthecaseofastaticexternalitywithdynamiceffects. Thereisno’learningexternality’
in this model. Instead, there is a production externality at the city level that could receive
any of the micro-foundations discussed in Sections 2 and 3.
Ioannides (1994) uses a structure similar to the one presented above but assumes that
ﬁnal goods are differentiated as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and that each city produces
a different set of goods as in Henderson and Abdel-Rahman (1991). This allows him to
derive an urban version of Romer’s (1987) growth model. Black and Henderson (1999) use
a slightly different speciﬁcation for both the urban production externality and commuting
costs in an economy with a growing population. In their case, the externality is weaker
than the one above so that if the population of cities remained constant it would not be
possible to have sustained growth. However, commuting costs are paid in ﬁnal goods so
that they become relatively less costly as human capital accumulates and productivity
65See Jones (2001) for a thorough presentation of modern growth theory and a discussion of this assump-
tion.
66In a more sophisticated model, δ is optimally chosen by workers and depends on their discount rate
(see the chapter by Baldwin and Martin, 2004, in this volume for further details).
45increases. This leads population in each city to increase, which in turn fuels further
growth.67
4.3.2 Dynamic externalities
Following Lucas (1988) and Eaton and Eckstein (1997), it is also possible to model urban
growth using dynamic externalities. In this case, we can assume that cities offer no
particular advantage with respect to the production of ﬁnal goods. Each worker in city i
faces constant returns and uses her human capital to produce a consumption good:
yi = kil , (54)
where ki is the human capital of this worker and l(< 1) is the fraction the worker’s time
spent producing. This worker also spends a fraction δ of her time accumulating human
capital according to:
˙ ki = δf(Ki,ki) , (55)
where ˙ ki denotesthevariationinthestockofhumancapitalofthisworkerand f(Ki,ki), the
’learning function’, is homogeneous of degree one in the workers human capital and the
aggregate stock of human capital in the city. For simplicity, we can again set δ exogenously
and assume that initially all workers have the same level of human capital. Further
assume that commuting costs are paid in units of time as in the previous subsection, so
that l = 1 − δ − τNi. Output per worker is then equal to yi = ki(1 − δ − τNi). Then, by






= δf(Ni,1) . (56)
Unlike in the previous subsection, growth is now driven by an externality in the accu-
mulation of human capital in the city: f(Ki,ki). Here we can speak of a dynamic externality.
Again, this externality plays a dual role as engine of growth and agglomeration force.68 However,
as in section 4.2, this function is ad-hoc and proper micro-foundations are still missing.
Instead of using embodied knowledge (i.e., human capital) as accumulation factor, it
is also possible to use disembodied knowledge (i.e., blueprints) following Romer (1990).
67See also Bertinelli and Black (2002). They assume an externality of aggregate human capital in the
production function but there is a time-lag before this externality materialises into higher productivity.
In a different context, Rauch (1993)’s speciﬁcation is also such that output per worker in a given period
is a positive function of the number of ﬁrms at the previous period. This type of speciﬁcation generates
interesting dynamics but strong micro-foundations are again missing.
68Note that in this particular model, cities are possibly too small in equilibrium because the positive
human capital externality is not internalised by workers. This is by no means a general result. Models of
Schumpeterian growth following Aghion and Howitt (1992) typically imply that the equilibrium growth
rate may be too large.
46In this case, providing micro-foundations seems easier because the accumulation equa-
tion becomes a production function for innovations so that the mechanisms described
in sections 2, 3, and 4.1 can be used. For instance, Helsley and Strange (2002) use a
matching argument between entrepreneurs and specialised inputs to justify why cities
favour innovation.
However sustained growth also requires that new innovations are proportional to the
quantity of past innovations. A simple way to do this is to argue that new innovations
have a public good property and add to the existing stock of knowledge. That is, there are
knowledge spill-overs. For cities to play an important role in the innovation process, these
spill-overs must be local in scope.69 Again, proper micro-foundations for local knowledge
spill-overs are still missing as highlighted earlier.
5. Concluding comments
The literature on the microeconomic foundations of urban agglomeration economies has
made enormous progress since the publication of the ﬁrst two volumes of this Handbook
series in 1984 and 1987. Partly, this follows progress made in related ﬁelds of research,
such as industrial organisation, labour economics, or growth theory. However, one of
the conclusions we can draw from this chapter is that the important insights were gained
not by mechanically adapting models developed in other ﬁelds but instead by carefully
combining them with ideas that already existed in urban economics.
Our knowledge of the microeconomic foundations of urban agglomeration economies
is now sufﬁciently developed for a few general conclusions to emerge. First, differ-
ent microeconomic mechanisms may be used to justify the existence of cities. These
mechanisms generate ﬁnal outcomes that are observationally equivalent in most (but
not all) respects. This ’Marshallian’ equivalence is partly good news in the sense that
the concept of urban agglomeration economies is robust to many different speciﬁcations
and microeconomic mechanisms. But this equivalence is also partly bad news because
empirically identifying and separating these mechanisms becomes very difﬁcult.70 Such
identiﬁcation is, however, crucial from a policy perspective. As discussed throughout
this chapter, the market failures associated with alternative mechanisms differ and so
do the corrective policies that they call for. We hope that future theoretical work on the
microeconomic foundations of urban increasing returns will pay more attention to these
69See Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a thorough discussion of the effects of the scope of spill-overs on
local growth in a trade context.
70All the more so because the beneﬁts from agglomeration may not percolate through wages or output
per worker but instead accrue directly to workers as shown above in Section 3.1.
47issues and will attempt to derive ‘unique’ (or at least more speciﬁc) predictions that can
serve for empirical identiﬁcation.
Second, heterogeneity (of workers and ﬁrms) is at the root of most if not all the
mechanisms explored in this chapter. It is very difﬁcult to conceive how interactions
within an ‘army of clones’ could generate sufﬁcient beneﬁts to justify the existence of
modern cities. Empirically, it is important to know at which level heterogeneity really
matters. Do the gains arise from some heterogeneity between suppliers in the same
narrowly deﬁned industry or is it between ﬁrms that belong to very different sectors?
This re-statement of the old ‘localisation vs. urbanisation’ debate will be tough to resolve
empirically. Furthermore, although heterogeneity appears to play a fundamental role, its
current treatment in existing models is rather thin. Firms in most models differ only in
terms of the horizontal characteristics of the goods that they produce. Empirical work
will face considerable difﬁculties to deal with this form of heterogeneity as horizontal dif-
ferentiation is notoriously difﬁcult to measure. At the same time, the coexistence of ﬁrms
of very different size, levels of productivity, and dynamic evolutions is an unavoidable
fact. We hope that future theoretical developments will not lag behind empirical work but
instead inform it and make progress in the same direction.
Third, incomplete information also often plays a crucial role. Cities make it easier to
ﬁnd inputs (be it workers, intermediate goods, etc.) and customers, to experiment, and
to discover new possibilities. This idea is particularly transparent in learning models,
but it is also at the heart of matching models as well as of some sharing models. This
suggests that the beneﬁts from cities are likely to be more important when the economic
environment is uncertain and fast-changing.
Fourth, this chapter also highlights that sharing and matching mechanisms are well
developed. However, the micro-foundations of learning mechanisms, and especially of
knowledge spill-overs, are far less satisfactory. Given the importance that such spill-overs
appeartoplayinourperceptionnotonlyofcitiesbutalsoofgrowthandinnovation, better
and more micro-founded models of learning and spill-overs ought to be an important
priority for research in this area.
Finally, we also know much more about the sources of agglomeration economies at
the level of cities (or for that matter at the level of regions — see Ottaviano and Thisse,
2004, in this volume) than at smaller spatial scales. Yet much of the public interest in
urban issues relates to local aspects of land use that affect the immediate environment in
which people live and work. Studying the micro-foundations of the micro-spatial aspects
of agglomeration ought to be another research priority.
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